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## OFF

### 1NC

T: USFG

#### Affs should defend hypothetical implementation of antitrust law in alignment with the resolution.

#### “Resolved” requires law

WP 64, (Words and Phrases, 1964, Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### “USFG” means any of the three branches

US Code 88, 42 U.S. Code § 4914, “Development of low-noise-emission products,” <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/4914>)

(2) The term “Federal Government” includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government of the United States, and the government of the District of Columbia.

#### “Core antitrust laws” are the Sherman, Clayon, and FTC Acts

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1 ⁠— fairness ⁠— a limited and predictable topic defines prep and research, while preventing the aff from skirting clash, moving to the fringes, and picking true arguments, which wrecks neg ground; this outweighs because debate’s a game ⁠— competition encourages research practices and innovation, which is a prerequisite to participation

#### 2 ⁠— clash ⁠— open subjects cause monopolization of the moral high ground, which denies a role for the neg and prevents second level understanding and turns case

Grossberg 15, Morris Davis Distinguished Professor University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Lawrence Grossberg, 2015, “We All Want to Change the World THE PARADOX OF THE U.S. LEFT A POLEMIC,” <http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/ebooks/we_all_want_to_change_the_world.pdf>)

I will, in the following description, focus on the situation in the human sciences (rather than the hard sciences), where the explosion of publication creates an ever-expanding circle in which there is always too much to read—too many positions, too many arguments, too much contradictory evidence—so that scholars have to rely on either the author's stature or theoretical and/or political agreement. It has become almost impossible to read everything one must read, everything necessary to legitimate, at least in traditional terms, the claim of academic expertise or scholarship. In fact, given this situation (and its consequences as I will describe below), the most surprising thing is how much good work continues to be produced. This situation has serious consequences: First, one's expertise becomes defined in increasingly narrow terms, resulting in the proliferation of sub-fields.9

[footnote 9 beings]

For example, one might point to security studies, surveillance studies, transition studies, game studies, code studies, hip-hop studies, horror studies, etc.

[footnote 9 ends]

And while each of them is valuable for their interdisciplinary efforts around a new empirical field, they all too often act as if the questions (and the realities they interrogate) are new; unfortunately, they rarely say anything new or surprising, anything that has not been said elsewhere. They frequently simply re-discover in their own empirical "pocket" universe what others have said previously in other fields. For example, all sorts of technologically defined sub-fields rediscover the rather old assumption that media audiences are active. This is partly because, within each subfield, one gets the impression of witnessing endless redistributions of a highly circumscribed set of citations and authors, under a series of ever-changing terms to describe their fields or positions. So, academics create ever shrinking circles in which authors cite a few theoretically and politically compatible works, and then follow the footnotes, all of which ultimately lead back to the original authors, creating an endlessly self-referential closed system of citations, a numbingly predictable, circular tissue of references. Second, one is less likely to read work that appears tangential but may nevertheless be absolutely decisive to produc[e]ing truly interesting and insightful research. Asking significant questions should demand that one makes reference to all sorts of concepts and questions which would lead one to follow other unexpected traditions and lines of research, since any investigation (e.g., around questions of participation, publics, or leadership, to use only a few examples that have irked me recently) is likely to open up to an entire history of problematization, of conversations and debates, but who can afford the time and energy anymore. Third, one tends to read only the most recent work since so much is being published—in various media—so rapidly that there is little time to go back and read. Fourth, one tends to select one's sources according to criteria that have more to do with theoretical and political sympathies than with an understanding of research as a conversation with difference. One reads selectively, finding those ideas that are already in line with what one assumes one already knows, and one establishes a body of near-sacred texts; fifth, one selects topics that are au courant, partly because there is less scaffolding that one has to build upon and partly because one's work is more likely to gain visibility and impact. Sixth, complexity goes out the door as one increasingly "sees the world in a grain of sand." One can no longer be satisfied claiming to have discovered merely a new piece of a complex puzzle or even an interesting redeployment of an older practice or structure, because such claims do not bring fame and glory—either to oneself or the university. Instead, one has to have discovered the leading edge, the new key or essence. One good but relatively small idea is expanded into a metonym for the entire economy, culture or society. Instead of seeking new discursive forms to embody complexity, uncertainty and humility, one goes with elegance, hyperbole and the ever receding new.

#### Policy debates over antitrust are valuable

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IV. Antitrust in Civil Society

Competition issues are also part of the general civic discourse separate from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals offered by politicians. This is also a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public at large. One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended for a lay audience that deal with the role of antitrust in a healthy economy and democracy. Recent and forthcoming books dealing with these themes include Tim Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,”109 Matt Stoller’s “Goliath,”110 Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,”111 Zephyr Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up,”112 and David Dayan’s “Monopolized.”113 On the academic side, there are a plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition114 and new works are flourishing which explore the broader ramifications of antitrust and competition in society.115 Long form and more mass-market journalism have also taken up the mantle of exploring the role of antitrust and competition policy. Such diverse magazines as The Atlantic,116 Time, 117 New Republic,118 American Prospect,119 Rolling Stone,120 New York Times magazine,121 Variety,122 National Review, 123 Foreign Policy,124 and other policy and opinion magazines have all run recent stories or profiles of individuals involved in antitrust issues. Before the COVID-19 pandemic effectively monopolized press coverage in the United States, there were thirty-three antitrust related stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its business section over a three-month period in late 2019. 125 A majority of the stories focused on tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.126 In addition, the New York Times also covered stories about mergers, merger policy, local issues such as the Chicago taxi market, and various smaller industries.127 This is separate from coverage during the same period of campaign issues and candidate statements relating to the field. A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed anecdotally in more business-oriented publications like Forbes, Barron’s, Wired, and the Wall Street Journal; general newspapers like USA Today, Washington Post, and Huffington Post; more local newspapers; as well as radio and television.128 Web pages and social media accounts on these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives.129 Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence. Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks there are now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus. These include the Open Markets Institute, 130 American Antitrust Institute, 131 Anti-Monopoly Fund,132 Institute for Self-Reliance,133 Public Citizen,134 Public Knowledge,135 Demos, 136 and the International Center for Law and Economics.137 At the more technical legal end of the debate, antitrust is similarly flourishing as a field. One sees increased law school hiring in the field for the first time in decades. Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety of perspectives ranging from libertarian to enforcement oriented.138 Most major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and economic experts on both sides of an issue both in the Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeals.139 Conclusion Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals can challenge different types of market behavior. In this way, antitrust has not changed. Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a meaningful part of the political and policy debate for candidates, the legislature, and important segments of civil society. What has changed, however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once mostly the domain of technocrats, antitrust issues have been proposed and debated by Presidential candidates, political parties, legislators, pundits, journalists, lobby groups, and voters alike. There are also a flurry of serious proposals and investigations that would make significant changes to the current system if adopted. This is all to the good. Even if none of the current proposals come to fruition, the antitrust debate is part of a broader engagement with political economy issues dealing with fundamental concerns such as economic concentration, globalization, income inequality, social and racial justice, and even recently the proper response to the COVID-19 emergency. The many proposals, initiatives, and pressure groups represent at a minimum the return of antitrust as part of the progressive agenda.

## Case

### 1NC---Turn

#### The aff is a call for the ballot in an academic space is a call for credit---It is a call to reward them with the ballot vs the negative --giving them credit for the arguments they made in the debate---to give them status in the academy through treating the ballot as a credit that can be cashed by advancing to the next round---It is the incorporation of asking judges for credit for the work that they have done. It double turns the aff---Moten and Harvey call for a complete rejection of credit.

Moten 13,Professor in the Department of Performance Studies at NYU. ( Fred, In The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, pp. 154-5)

FRED: I think this is where that distinction Stefano made between credit and debt is crucial. I think what people may mean, when they talk about the abolition of debt, is the abolition of credit. But they probably don’t even really mean that. What they probably technically mean is forgiveness, which is to say, “we’ll forgive this loan. Now, if you get in debt again, we’re gonna want to get paid, goddamnit.” Whereas, what Stefano is talking about, I think and I concur, is an abolition of credit, of the system of credit, which is to say, maybe it’s an abolition of accounting. It says that when we start to talk about our common resources, when we talk about what Marx means by wealth – the division of it, the accumulation of it, the privatization of it, and the accounting of it – all of that shit should be abolished. I mean, you can’t count how much we owe one another. It’s not countable. It doesn’t even work that way. Matter of fact, it’s so radical that it probably destabilizes the very social form or idea of ‘one another.’ But, that’s what Édouard Glissant is leading us towards when he talks about what it is “to consent not to be a single being.” And if you think about it, it is a sort of flial and essentially a maternal relation. When I say ‘maternal,’ what I’m implying there is the possibility of a general socialisation of the maternal.

### 1NC---Defense

#### The aff fails ⁠— it can’t escape the university, is too vague, fails to influence materiality, and trades off with projects of world-making

Webb 18, Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Sheffield (Darren Webb, 3-20-2018, "Bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system: On forms of academic resistance (or, can the university be a site of utopian possibility?)," Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, Vol. 40, Issue 2, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10714413.2018.1442081)

Creating utopian spaces within the corporate-imperial university

In the 1960s it seemed perfectly reasonable to ascribe a utopian mission to the university. The expansion of the higher education sector saw the creation of a wave of new “utopian universities”—universities deemed to be “utopian” in terms of their architecture, curricula, modes of teaching, internal policies and structure (IHR 2014). It was not uncommon to refer to the university as a “utopian community” (Gray 2012, 54). As late as 1994, Edward Said was maintaining that the Anglo-American university remained a “quasi-utopian space” (Said 1994, 82). Sustained criticism of the corporate-imperial university began to take hold in the mid-1990s (e.g., Readings 1996; Slaughter and Leslie 1997), shortly after Said’s study of the modern intellectual, and it has become increasingly difficult to locate utopian possibilities in the curricula, policies and structures of the contemporary academy. A growing number of academics feel compelled to resign their posts in the face of intolerable working conditions. Writing in The Times Higher, one such academic claims that there is no longer scope for resistance within the university. The university is such a constrained space that the battle to reclaim it from the managers and bureaucrats “can only properly be fought from the outside” (Morrish 2017, 49). There are some, however, who still believe in the utopian potential of the academy. For Henry Giroux, “utopianism consists of the seemingly outmoded idea that education, in the broad sense, consists of intervening in the world in order to change it” (2000, 140). Giroux has consistently argued that the university remains one of the few democratic public spheres where a truly transformative “militant utopianism” can operate (e.g., Giroux 2002, 101; 2014a, 49). Others concur, placing heavy emphasis on the process of creating spaces. Thus, even within the corporate-imperial university there is scope for “the creation of autonomous spaces for radical teaching and learning” (Coté, Day, and de Peuter 2007b, 334). The role of the utopian educator is “to create a space for experiments in new forms of thought and practice” (Firth 2013, 261), “opening intentional spaces that enable unintended possibilities” (Fenwick 2006, 19). Through “our pedagogies and academic work,” we can create “insurgent spaces within the academy” (Chatterjee and Sunaina 2014, 43), “anti-imperial spaces … within the imperial university” (Falcon et al. 2014, 266). Indeed, we are called upon “to devise such spaces in academic life and to fashion them where possible” (Dallyn, Marinetto, and Cederstrom 2015, 1042). The key to the utopian response to the corporate-imperial university, then, seems to lie in creating spaces. The utopian academic asks “What spaces of possibility are open to us?” and adopts “an ethos of experimentation that is oriented toward carving out spaces for resistance and reconstruction here and now” (Coté, Day, and de Peuter 2007a, 320, 317). In such a spirit, this article explores three specific “spaces” of resistance, reconstruction and utopian possibility: the classroom; the undercommons; and the occupation. The article argues that although these spaces offer scope for fleeting, transitory, small-scale experiences of utopian possibility, they function more as bolt-holes, breathing spaces, and places of refuge. The article concludes by arguing that the “utopian” academic does have a role to play, but this lies in exploiting their own privilege and working with students, communities and movements outside and divorced from the university.

The utopian classroom

In Teaching to Transgress, bell hooks heralded the university seminar room as “a place where paradise can be created” (hooks 1994, 207). How might we conceive the contemporary seminar room as such a space? It is important to remind ourselves here that domination is always partial and “leaky” (Giroux 2000, 144). Mainstream educational settings are not completely closed and educational practices are not totally controlled (Evans and Giroux 2015, 33). Spaces for “utopian pedagogical experimentation” still exist (Dyer-Witherford 2007, 59). It is still possible, for example, to teach “radical” courses that link everyday life to the production of values and power (Coté, Day, and de Peuter 2007b), to offer “subversive” collective readings of utopian texts (Seyferth 2009), and to practice “disruptive” pedagogies that encourage the emergence of counter-narratives (Adsit et al. 2015). There is scope still for a dialogical pedagogy that prefigures in the very process of collaborative learning the kind of social relations that might characterize an alternative way of being. In the classroom, “we can show [students] that there are possibilities for doing things another way, that we don’t have to live like this if we choose not to do so” (Shannon 2009, 188). But let us acknowledge the limitations. A seminar, an undergraduate module, a Masters program—these are going to do little to challenge the corporate-imperial university. The utopian educator may work hard to protect their autonomous learning spaces, and to make these sites for experiments in new forms of thought and practice, but we should not overestimate their transformative potential. Here I note four limitations to the utopian classroom: Firstly, there is often a profound disjuncture between the claims made on behalf of a particular program or project and the realities of its enactment. Mike Neary’s “student-as-producer,” for example, sought “to design an alternative model for the university, as a rehearsal for an alternative social world within which it might subsist” (Neary 2010). Informed by Marx, Benjamin, Lefebvre, Debord, and others, student-as-producer “brings revolutionary pedagogy to life” and prefigures a postcapitalist society characterized by “from each according to their abilities” (Neary 2012a, 5–6). On paper, then, it seems that Neary—occupying a position of power as Dean of Teaching and Learning at the University of Lincoln between 2007–2014—was creating a transformative utopian space in every classroom across the entire campus. The reality, however, was somewhat more modest. Beneath the endless references to radical thinkers past and present, what student-as-producer actually did was enhance the research component of the undergraduate curriculum (Neary 2014) while being pragmatically “mindful of the need for the university to survive and prosper” (Neary 2010). A worthwhile endeavor certainly, but hardly a revolutionary project prefiguring post-capitalist society. The field of critical pedagogy/radical education is heavy on bombast and the realities of the utopian classroom often fall short of the theory-heavy promises.6 Secondly, a focus on the classroom as the site of utopian practice is sometimes accompanied by a simplistic model of social change. Even in its most revolutionary formulations—in the work of Paula Allman (2001), for example—the classroom interactions of the utopian educator are directed towards transforming individual consciousness. It is then assumed that enlightened individuals, newly conscientized, will leave the classroom and somehow bring about social change (Lissovoy 2009, 198; Cho 2013, 94). At its worst, utopian pedagogy shares the quasi-colonial understanding of change typical of the corporate-imperial university. Wink, for example, tells us that radical pedagogy “starts in the classroom but goes out into the community to make life a little better” (Wink 2011, 24). Darder, too, talks about an emancipatory pedagogy that seeks to “reach beyond the boundaries of the classroom into communities, workplaces, and public arenas” (Darder 2009, 158). Here we have a process akin to the manifold “outreach” activities undertaken by higher education institutions, through which communities are blessed by interventions from the academy, “reaching out” to make their lives a little better, in a contemporary form of noblesse oblige (Seybold 2008). Thirdly, the corporate-imperial university draws strength from the utopian classroom, happily accommodating sites of resistance in order to recuperate them as symbols of its tolerance (Oparah 2014). The utopian classroom might be seen as “a release-valve for intellectual dissonance … supervised by its very enemies” (Inoperative Committee 2011, 4). A release valve because, as Michael Apple has long complained, radical pedagogy is often adopted to resolve personal crises brought about by the “contradictory class location” of academics who want to portray themselves as politically engaged (2013, 14). Spaces of experimentation within the academy may have as much to do with “a certain ritual of self-display” as they do with any form of genuine commitment to social transformation (Ĉiĉigoj, Apostolou-Hölscher, and Rusham 2015, 272). Students, too, are aware that “radical” courses on campus serve as a “vaccination” against future outbreaks of radicalism in society at large (Anon 2010c, 32). As one group put it: “A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism” (Anon 2010b, 15). This release of dissonance is supervised by its enemies in the simple but very real sense that contemporary university governance includes so that it can control (De Nicola and Roggero 2011, 36). Finally, the utopian classroom will never be anything more than a fringe performance to be tolerated at the margins. The university, of course, is hostile to radical learning spaces “trying to establish outcomes contrary to the logic of the market” (Albert 2007, 324). It is well noted that critical/radical/utopian spaces within the academy are shrinking (Shear 2008, 56; Canaan 2013; Amsler 2015, 169, Lawrence 2015) and that departments offering perspectives challenging the mainstream risk closure (Seybold 2008, 117–118; Adsit et al. 2015, 22). It is also worth highlighting that the utopian university is unviable in the absence of wider systemic change because, quite simply, “any university that operated along these lines would quickly become irrelevant to the vast majority of people who need an education that provides them with a better chance of finding work” (Holmes and Research and Destroy and Dead Labour 2011, 13). The utopian classroom, then, will remain a novelty to be controlled within the corporate-imperial university. And “as long as the radical is in the minority, as long as the radical is unable to drive campus culture, nothing is threatened” (Prashad 2014, 330). The utopian classroom is more a safe haven to retreat to than a space that can spearhead social transformation. I am taken in particular by Zaslove’s (2007, 98) description of utopian pedagogy as “an exiled form of education” in search of “bolt holes and breathing spaces in the system.” This is a powerful and illuminating metaphor. The dictionary definition of bolt-hole is, “A place where you can escape and hide from something that is dangerous or unpleasant.” The “search for bolt-holes” captures something of the reality of utopian pedagogy within the corporate-imperial university. The utopian classroom creates a breathing space in the suffocating environment of the formal education system, a safe space in which one can hide from the dangerous spread of market forces and the unpleasant stench of neoliberalism. But the utopian educator is forever on the back foot, retreating, as spaces shrink. The utopian classroom may offer refuge and respite but something more is needed.

The undercommons

“The undercommons” is associated with the work of Fred Moten, Stefano Harney (Harney and Moten 2013) and Stevphen Shukaitis (2009; Undercommoning Collective 2016). At one level, undercommoning is concerned with creating spaces within the academy—“liminal and recombinant spaces” for “subversion” and “sabotage,” as Shukaitis puts it (Shukaitis 2009, 173). These spaces are infused with a utopian dimension as they are inhabited by a network of radical alliances who resist elitism, enclosure, commercialization, and “seek to mobilize the unique historical location and material power of the university to imagine and build a world beyond the present order” (Haiven and Khasnabish 2014, 12). By undercommoning together and forging solidarities, the tensions and contradictions of the contemporary academy can be transformed into “visions, actions and experiments for a radically different world” (Undercommoning Collective 2016). But the undercommons is more than just the creation of spaces with utopian intent. It is a shifting matrix of spaces, processes, relations, and structures of feeling. Harney and Moten do attach importance to teaching and the classroom—in particular as an opportunity to refuse the call to order—but the undercommons exists in institutional cracks outside the classroom: in stairwells, in alleys, in kitchens, in corridors, in smoking areas, in hiding. The undercommons is a community of maroons, outcasts, and fugitives, not of responsible teachers. It is “always an unsafe neighbourhood” (Harney and Moten 2013, 28). In fact, the undercommons is best described as a way of being: a way of being within and against one’s institution and a way of being with and for the community of outcasts (Melamed 2016). Within and against the corporate-imperial university, the subversive intellectual is unprofessional, uncollegial, impractical, disruptive, disloyal, unproductive, unreliable, “obstructive and shiftless, dumb with insolence,” forever refusing the call to order (Harney and Moten 2013, 34). With and for the undercommons, hapticality describes a way of feeling that is at once unsettled—“to feel at home with the homeless, at ease with the fugitive, at peace with the pursued”—and intensely intimate—“the capacity to feel through others, for others to feel through you, for you to feel them feeling you” (97–98). Together, the maroons of the undercommons engage in study; a mode of sociality, “a kind of way of being with others,” walking and talking and thinking and working together “in a way that feels good, the way it should feel good” (111–112, 117). There is a definite utopian project at work here. Moten tells us that “I believe in the world and want to be in it. I want to be in it all the way to the end of it because I believe in another world in the world and I want to be in that” (Harney and Moten 2013, 118). The undercommons is presented as an entry point to this other world in the world. It is a “utopic commonunderground,” a utopia “submerged in the interstices and on the outskirts of the fierce and urgent now” (Moten 2008, 1746; Harney and Moten 2013, 51). The call to both disorder and to study—what Freire might have termed the utopian process of denunciation-annunciation—becomes an ontological enactment of something that is already here (Harney and Moten 2013, 133–134). For Harney in particular, the undercommons as a way of being can be understood in terms of rhythm. It is a new rhythm working against the global rhythm of work, the “global assembly line tearing apart the functions of man,” the rhythm of inputs and outputs every facet of which must be “measured and managed” (Harney 2015, 174–176). In contrast, the rhythm of the undercommons is “a militant arrhythmia” that unsettles the rhythm of the line, “invites us to feel around us” and brings the utopic commonunderground into the open (177–178). It is easy to be seduced by the language of the undercommons. Embodying and enacting it, however, is difficult indeed. Being within and against the university, refusing the call to order through insolent obstructive unprofessionalism, is almost impossible to sustain. Halberstam (2009, 45) describes the undercommons as “a marooned community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of rigor, excellence, and productivity.” A romantic and appealing notion for sure but refusing and reneging on “the university of excellence” will cost you your job. When Moten describes subversion as a “series of immanent upheavals” expressed through “vast repertoires of high-frequency complaints, imperceptible frowns, withering turns, silent sidesteps, and ever-vigilant attempts not to see and hear” (2008, 1743), one is reminded instantly of Thomas Docherty, disciplined and suspended for his negative vibes.7 Being with and for the maroon community is difficult too. First of all, “Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work?” (Ĉiĉigoj, Apostolou-Hölscher, and Rusham 2015, 265). Where and how can one find those liminal spaces of sabotage and subversion, and how does one occupy them in a spirit of hapticality, study, and militant arrhythmia that brings the utopic underground to the surface of the fierce and urgent now? Beautiful language, but how does one live it? Networks do, of course, exist—the Undercommoning Collective, the Edu-Factory Collective, the International Network for Alternative Academia, to name but a few. These are promising spaces for bringing together and harboring the maroons and the fugitives. But networks are typically short-lived, and—as Harney and Moten warned—there is a danger of institutionalization, of taking institutional practices with you into alternative spaces “because we’ve been inside so much” (Harney and Moten 2013, 148). And so, predictably, meetings of the fugitives come with structure, order, an official agenda, and circulated minutes. The outcasts convene in conventional academic conferences, with parallel sessions, panels of papers, lunch breaks, wine and nibbles (e.g., Edu-Factory 2012). These spaces offer time out, welcome respite, a breathing space, a trip abroad, and then one returns to work. If hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, is “a visceral register of experience … the feel that what is to come is here” (Bradley 2014, 129–130), then this seems elusive. It is hard to detect a sense of the utopic undercommons rising to the surface of the corporate-imperial university. Moten describes the call to disorder and to study as a way to “excavate new aesthetic, political, and economic dispositions” (Moten 2008, 1745). But this notion of excavating is highly problematic. It is common within the discourse of “everyday utopianism”—finding utopia in the everyday, recovering lost or repressed transcendence in “everydayness” (Gardiner 2006)—to describe the process of utopian recovery in terms of excavating: excavating repressed desires, submerged longings, suppressed histories, untapped possibilities. But the fundamental questions of where to dig and how to identify a utopian “find” are never adequately addressed (see Webb 2017). Gardiner defines utopia as “a series of forces, tendencies and possibilities that are immanent in the here and now, in the pragmatic activities of everyday life” (2006, 2). But how are these forces, tendencies and possibilities to be identified and recovered? For Harney and Moten, it is through study, hapticality and militant arrhythmia. These are slippy concepts, however, evading concrete material referents. What is it to inhabit the undercommons? Those who have written of their experiences refer to “small acts of marronage” such as poaching resources and redeploying them in ways at odds with the university’s designs and demands (Reddy 2016, 7), or exploiting funding streams “to form cracks in the institution that enable the Others to invade the university” (Smith, Dyke, and Hermes 2013, 150). For Adusei-Poku (2015), the undercommons is a space of refuge which is all about survival (2015, 4–5). We who feel homeless in the university are forced into refuge. We gather together to survive. We may gain satisfaction from small acts of marronage, but this is less about bringing the utopic common underground to the surface as it is a form of “radical escapism” (Adusei-Poku 2015, 4). Benveniste (2015, v) tells us that: “The undercommons has no set location and no return address. There is no map for entering and no guide for staying. The only condition is a living appetite. Listen to its hunger for difference.” We need more than poetry, however. And we need more than a series of minor acts of resistance. As Srnicek and Williams rightly emphasize, resistance is a defensive, reactive gesture, resisting against. Resistance is not a utopian=endeavour: “We do not resist a new world into being” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 47). The undercommons, when one can find it, is a bolt hole, a place of refuge, a breathing space in the system. We need something more.

The occupation

Can the occupied building operate as a site of utopian possibility within the corporate-imperial university? Reflections on, and theorizations of, two recent waves of occupation—“Occupied California” 2009–2010 and the UK Occupations 2010–2011—have answered this question affirmatively. The “occupation” should not be understood here as solely or necessarily “student occupation.” It goes without saying—though sadly so often does need saying—that “faculty also have a responsibility to fight with and for students” (Smeltzer and Hearn 2015, 356). Though led by a new historical subject, “the graduate without a future” (Schwarz-WeinStein 2015, 11), the importance of faculty support for the occupations was emphasized on both sides of the Atlantic (Research and Destroy 2010, 11; Dawson 2011, 112; Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 14; Ismail 2011, 128; Newfield and Edu-Factory 2011, 26). Long before Occupy took shape in Zuccotti Park, “occupation” was being heralded as the harbinger of a new society and a new way of being. If we return to the notion of creating utopian spaces, the key aim for some of the occupiers was to create communes within the university walls—to communize space (Inoperative Committee 2011, 6).8 Communization here is understood as a form of insurrectionary anarchism that refuses to talk of a transition to communism, insisting instead upon the immediate formation of zones of activity removed from exchange, money, compulsory labor, and the impersonal domination of the commodity form (Anon 2010a, 5). As one pamphlet declared: We will take whatever measures are necessary both to destroy this world as quickly as possible and to create, here and now, the world we want: a world without wages, without bosses, without borders, without states. (Anon 2010d, 34) This is a revolutionary anarchism that takes the university campus as the site for a practice—communization—that not only prefigures but also realizes the vision of a free society. Heavily influenced by The Coming Insurrection (Invisible Committee 2009), but tapping into a long tradition of anarchist theory and practice from Hakim Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zones (Bey 1985) to David Graeber’s Direct Action (Graeber 2009), occupation becomes “the creation of a momentary opening in capitalist time and space, a rearrangement that sketches the contours of a new society” (Research and Destroy 2010, 11). It is “an attempt to imagine a new kind of everyday life” (Hatherley 2011, 123). Firth (2012) refers to these momentary openings as critical, experimental utopias: Such utopias are … simultaneously immanent and prefigurative. They are immanent insofar as they allow space for the immediate expression of desires, satisfaction of needs and also the articulation of difference or dissent. They are prefigurative to the extent that they allow one to practice and exemplify what one would like to see at a more proliferative range in the future (26) The ultimate aim is for the practice to spread beyond the campus through a dual process of provocative rupture—the idea that insurrectionary moments can unleash the collective imagination and stimulate an outpouring of creativity that blows apart common sense and offers glimpses of a future world (Gibson-Graham 2006, 51; Shukaitis and Graeber 2007, 37)—and “contaminationism,” that is, spreading by means of example (Graeber 2009, 211). It may well have been the case that communism was realized on the campuses of Berkeley and UCL, that a momentary opening in capitalist space/time appeared through which another world could be glimpsed. The occupation, however—whether California, London, or anywhere else—is likely always to remain a localized temporary disruptive practice. A practice with utopian potency, for sure, in terms of suspending normalized forms of discipline and opening new egalitarian discursive spaces (Rheingans and Hollands 2013; Nişancioğlu and Pal 2016). In terms of wider systemic change, however, “small interventions consisting of relatively non-scalable actions are highly unlikely to ever be able to reorganise our socioeconomic system” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 29). What “the occupation” demonstrates more than anything is the reality of the corporate-imperial university, as the institutional hierarchy, backed by the carceral power of the police and criminal justice system, inevitably disperses the occupiers—often using militarized force—and repossesses the occupied space in a strong assertion of its ownership rights not only to university buildings but also to what constitutes legitimate thought and behavior within them (on this see Docherty 2015, 90). The significance, and utopian potential, one attaches to campus occupations depends in part upon the significance one attaches to the university as a site of struggle. For the Edu-Factory Collective: As was the factory, so now is the university. Where once the factory was a paradigmatic site of struggle between workers and capitalists, so now the university is a key space of conflict, where the ownership of knowledge, the reproduction of the labour force, and the creation of social and cultural stratifications are all at stake. This is to say the university is not just another institution subject to sovereign and governmental controls, but a crucial site in which wider social struggles are won and lost. (Caffentzis and Federici 2011, 26) Clearly, if this is true, then the form the struggle takes, and the example it sets, is of immense significance. Srnicek and Williams describe as “wishful thinking” the idea that the occupation might spread beyond the campus by means of rupture or contamination (2016, 35). However, if the university really is a key site of class struggle (Seybold 2008, 120; Haiven and Khasnabish 2014, 38), a site through which wider struggles are refracted and won or lost, then the transformative potential of the occupation needs to be attended to seriously. The analysis of the university offered by the Edu-Factory Collective is, however, outdated. Sounding like Daniel Bell writing in 1973 about how universities had become the “axial structures” of post-industrial society (Bell 1973, 12), the analysis does not hold water today. Moten overdoes it when he tells us that “the university is a kind of corpse. It is dead. It’s a dead institutional body” (Moten 2015, 78). What is clear, however, is that “focusing on the university as a site of radical transformation is a mistake” (Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 13). As has been widely noted, there is very little distinguishing universities from other for-profit corporations (Readings 1996; Lustig 2005; Washburn 2005; Shear 2008, Tuchman 2009). What does separate them is their inefficiency, due in large part to the fact that universities operate also as medieval guilds, with faculties “ruled by masters who lord over journeymen and apprentices in an artisanal system of production” (Jemielniak and Greenwood 2015, 77). If the university is a sinister hybrid monstrosity—part medieval guild, part criminal corporation—which has no role other than reproducing its own privilege, then no special status can be attributed to campus protests. In this case, “A free university in the midst of a capitalist society is like a reading room in a prison” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). A reading room in a prison. Another apposite metaphor. The occupation is a safe space, offering temporary respite, a place to hide, a refuge, a bolt-hole, a breathing space. As with the utopian classroom and the undercommons, what the occupation suggests is that “defending small bunkers of autonomy against the onslaught of capitalism is the best that can be hoped for” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 48).

#### Individual strategies fail to influence the world

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More than a decade and a half ago I criticized similar formulations of a notion of “infrapolitics,” understood as the domain of pre-political acts of everyday “resistance” undertaken by subordinated populations, which was then all the rage in cultural studies programs. Proponents of the political importance of this domain insisted that, because insurgent movements emerge within such cultures of quotidian resistance, a) examining them could help in understanding the processes through which insurgencies develop and/or b) they therefore ought to be considered as expressions of an insurgent politics themselves. Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political economy of academic life, including the self-propulsion of academic trendiness and the atrophy of the left outside the academy, which encouraged flights into fantasy for the sake of optimism. The infrapolitics idea also resonated with the substantive but generally unadmitted group essentialism underlying claims that esoteric, insider knowledge is necessary to decipher the “hidden transcripts” of the subordinate populations; put more bluntly, elevating infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its interpreters’ academic capital.8 I discussed those factors in my critique. However, the point in that argument most pertinent for evaluating Birch and Heideman’s confidence that the contradictions they acknowledge in BLM should be seen only as growing pains of a “new movement” is the following: At best, those who romanticize “everyday resistance” or “cultural politics” read the evolution of political movements teleologically; they presume that those conditions necessarily, or even typically, lead to political action. They don’t. Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Think about it: infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political movements are rare.9

#### The 1AC is merely intellectual radicalism that fails to create revolution

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Misuse of ‘revolution’ Radical dreams of freedom are uncompromising, totalising and demand the complete transformation of the social, political and economic order. For radicals the only solution is revolution, in order to ‘overturn’ and ‘destroy’ the existing system.21 But Malcolm warned that ‘many of our people are using this word “revolution” loosely’,22 lightly embracing radical rhetoric without truly taking on board revolutionary practice. This critique definitely applies to Black politics and theory, where to be radical or revolutionary appears to mean adopting a position that differs somewhat from the norm. Part of the misuse of the term revolution is closely tied to the idea that change must come from within before it can lead to social transformation. For cultural nationalists that is the spiritual and cultural transformation; in academia we focus on the ideas, the knowledge to produce change. While acknowledging that Cesaire’s negritude movement was ‘never intended to be a road map or a blueprint for revolution’, Kelley contends that his classic work Discourse on Colonialism was ‘poetry and therefore revolt’. He goes further to argue that the book was an ‘act of insurrection … a hand grenade thrown with deadly accuracy, clearing the field so that we might write a new history with what’s left standing’.23 Cesaire is the perfect figure to explain the limits of intellectual radicalism. As we explored in Chapter 3, his work was hugely influential, with Fanon crediting him for transforming how Black subjects of colonialism saw themselves. But we also discussed how Cesaire was a French republican to the core, who did not see liberation from France as being desirable. Negritude was about claiming Black personhood in order to integrate more equally into the Western ideal. There is nothing radical or revolutionary about the project. Just because it went against the prevailing ideas of the time (that Black people were inferior) that does not make it radical. To judge the radical nature of an argument we have to engage in the ‘new history’ that it writes, not just its condemnation of the old one. To be revolutionary also means going beyond deconstructing the present and offering abstract visions of a different future. This clearly applies to a range of post-structural theoretical reminiscences on society that even if they were written intelligibly would make little sense. In terms of Black radicalism the more common misuse of revolutionary relates to giving too much power to music and popular culture. Moten argues that ‘Black radicalism is (like) music. The broken circle demands a new analytic (way of listening to the music)’.24 He spends a lot of time making the argument that Black music with its different arrangements, soulful cries and boundary-breaking forms of expression represent the ‘aesthetics’ of Black radicalism. Kelley speaks of the ‘revolutionary nature of the blues’,25 and the power of the surreal in transforming our vision for reality. A lot of emphasis is placed on this work in the idea of desire, fantasy and soul being alternative concepts to build our understanding on rather than European ideas of rationality. To be a blues people is to embody a different form of being, and can perhaps lead to a revolutionary transformation of society based on ‘love and creativity’.26 There’s certainly something romantic about the idea of the artists, writers, poets and musicians being the revolutionary vanguard, painting a new vision for the future and calling us to its tune. However, in reality this is just an intellectual version of cultural nationalism. We know society is corrupt but instead of trying to overthrow it we seek solace in the beauty that has been created in the hideous. We can affirm ourselves by getting lost in the sorrow songs, fiction and poetry or watching the achingly beautiful choreography of the Alvin Ailey Dance Theatre. But none of this culture, no matter how beautiful or genre defying, is revolutionary. It does not pave the way for revolution, or even in itself open up possibilities. Culture is always a product of the political moment. Slavery and marronage make the blues; the New Negro movement shapes the Harlem Renaissance; Pan-Africanism calls into existence Afro-beat; Rastafari and Garveyism produce Reggae; and Black Power creates the Black Arts movement. Even the lack of cohesive Black political movements can be traced to the commercialisation and gangstaisation of Hip Hop. In a memorable quote from the James Baldwin documentary I am Not Your Negro, he explains that he was a ‘witness’ to the political events that shaped his work. The film is based on a book he was writing about Malcolm X, Martin Luther King and Medgar Evers. Unlike those three he was not a leader in any organisation, and he did not pay with his life for his commitment. Baldwin was on the side-lines, linked in but not fully part of the movements. This is not to belittle or downplay Baldwin’s role, but to recognise it. Artists document the political moment, they do not create it. It is a vital role, but not a revolutionary one.

#### They draw the wrong inference from the flux of blackness ⁠— it can change, which proves that it is a racial formation that movements and state engagement can overcome; Moten agrees

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Simone Browne points out that we have to grapple with the ontological conditions of blackness in order to develop a theory of racializing surveillance. 76 I align myself with Browne and further suggest that the same holds true regarding any resistance to racializing surveillance (e.g. copwatching). It is not enough, however, to situate blackness in relation to ontology. The Western conceptualization of being falls short when it comes to blackness – and thus we need new philosophical idioms and categories which are not contingent on racist assumptions (in a “decolonialization of the epistemic”).77 On the following pages I argue for a paraontological framing of black resistance/being in the vein of Black Optimism. It is mainly an abstract discussion serving to lay a theoretical foundation for the subsequent chapters. An important first distinction to make is that between blackness and the lived experience of being (considered) black. It has been suggested by Frantz Fanon, through Sylvia Wynter, that blackness can be seen as an objective fact – that is, a separate entity from any multitude of black subjectivities.78 We can think about it the way any culture tend to be framed through a post-modern lens; as something constantly in flux but nevertheless real.79 For Rinaldo Walcott blackness can be seen as a sign “that carries with it particular histories of resistance and domination” – “never closed and always under contestation.”80 From such an outset you can infer the general postulate that not all persons who are deemed black by society are necessarily part of (the culture of) blackness. Blackness is something you take active part in (shaping), but the lines between signifier and signified are blurred, since blackness is both “identity and culture, history and present […].”81 The lived experience of blackness actualizes the imposition of race onto black bodies and lives.82 “[O]ne’s being is experienced through others,” as Browne describes it.83 This is echoed in Sara Ahmed, who claims that “racism ensures that the black gaze returns to the black body, which is not a loving return but rather follows the line of the white hostile gaze.”84 The phenomenon Ahmed describes is arguably the same phenomenon which led Fanon to famously say that his black body was reduced to “an object among other object.”85 At this juncture, the ontology of blackness intersects the constitutive forces which racializes the black body, as Ahmed shows: The alignment of race and space are crucial to how they materialize as givens, as if each “extends” the other. In other words, while “the other side of the world” is associated with “racial otherness,” racial others become associated with “the other side of the world.” They come to embody distance. The embodiment of distance is what makes whiteness “proximate,” as the “starting point” for orientation.86 Consequently, blackness is not only constructed as the negation of ontology through a hierarchical episteme – but its ontological status is also reified and veiled as something natural by the “alignment of race and space.”87 Thus, although separate, blackness and black bodies are intimately related to each other. By extension, I assert that the black person should have an ethical interpretative prerogative with regards to the lived experience and phenomenological aspects of blackness – a reason why I so frequently quote participants in the field study. However, the statements of participants must be read critically against each other, and in relation to scholars such as Ahmed. One participant alone cannot represent the overarching complexity of blackness. Nor should they be forced to do so, or construed as doing so.88 I thus align myself with Harney and Moten, who states that blackness “must be understood in its ontological difference from black people who are, nevertheless, (under)privileged insofar as they are given (to) an understanding of it.”89

3.1. Ontology as Resistance

The paraontological hinges on the notion that blackness comes prior to governance.90 In other words, that blackness is not a response to regulative power, but rather the other way around: “Power is a response to the uncontainable priority of blackness.”91 To be clear, we can think of the slave trader as imposing a regulatory violence seeking to “ensnare” an already prior freedom.92 To Harney and Moten, this prior freedom is integral to blackness, as an “anoriginary drive” – which translates to something like an immanent force of resistance or insubordination, in my reading.93 The important point at this stage is that blackness is constitutive; “neither an aberration nor an effect of power.”94 What emerges from this line of thinking is [not only that] blackness is ontologically prior to the logistic and regulative power that is supposed to have brought it into existence but that blackness is prior to ontology; or, in a slight variation of what [Nahum Dimitri] Chandler would say, blackness is the anoriginal displacement of ontology, that it is ontology’s anti- and antefoundation, ontology’s underground, the irreparable disturbance of ontology’s time and space.95 In other words, the paraontological entails not only that blackness is anterior to ontology, but also that this anteriority (“anti- and ante-foundation” in Moten) displaces ontology and inhabits an “underground” position – or the “undercommons” – from which resistance can take shape.96 According to Moten, the “undercommons” must withdraw from the framework posed by ontology and “refuse subjection to ontology’s sanction against the very idea of black subjectivity.”97 By extension, frami ng the distinction between blackness and black people through a paraontological lens lets us separate blackness from the question of (Western ontological) being altogether.98 Drawing from Moten, this leads David Kline to claim that “[b]lackness is a counter-force to ontology itself [italicized in original].” 99

3.2. Anteriority and Activism

This subchapter is an extension of the discussion above, but it is also an attempt to specifically highlight aspects of paraontology which can be productive for a discussion in relation to the field study. An important first step is to delineate the paraontological as separate from the politico-ontological, in order to avoid a misreading. In contrast to the politico-ontological, the paraontological namely designates a mode of being which is “always [by definition] already resisting the imposing logic of (political) ontology.”100 In other words, by being prior to ontology it conjoins with utopian visions to establish a political position outside of ontology altogether.101 In the vein of Black Optimism, Moten sees blackness as “not reducible to its social costs; [but] also manifest in a set of benefits and responsibilities.” 102 There is always a surplus to the suppression of blackness; or, “lines of flight” to speak with Deleuze.103 There is an anoriginary drive whose fateful internal difference (as opposed to fatal flaw) is that it brings regulation into existence, into a history irregularly punctuated by transformations that drive imposes upon regulation. Those transformative impositions show up for us now as compensation and surplus: as the payment of a massive and incalculable debt by the ones who not only never promised it […].104 To be clear, the “transformative impositions” Moten refers to could be read as, for instance, impositions on lawmaking brought about by the civil rights movement – which today creates a “surplus” and spaces for resistance. However, such “transformative impositions” do not necessarily have to occur in a formal way, changing dominant structures of society (e.g. laws); these impositions are the effect of the “anoriginary drive” and could take place on a micropolitical scale or outside the sovereign state itself (e.g. black nationalism).105 The ontological foundation in and of “Man” circumscribes blackness into negation. In Moten’s words, “[t]he givenness and substantiveness of transcendental subjectivity is assured by a relative nothingness.”106 Moten’s use of “nothingness” corresponds to a famous passage in Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks: I feel my soul as vast as the world, truly a soul as deep as the deepest of rivers; my chest has the power to expand to infinity. I was made to give and they prescribe for me the humility of the cripple. When I opened my eyes yesterday I saw the sky in total revulsion. I tried to get up but eviscerated silence surged toward me with paralyzed wings. Not responsible for my acts, at the crossroads between Nothingness and Infinity, I began to weep.107 We could read Fanon’s first sentence as something closely related to Moten’s anorginary drive; a freedom which is then “crippled” by external forces. This is also in line with Nana Adusei-Poku, who further suggests that the lived experience of blackness can recode this nothingness into a “foundational ground, or as anti-/ante-ground, as a void that sustains.”108 Thus, although Fanon was trapped in this nothingness, the same “black abyss” can serve as a space to draw creative power from – which reconnects back to Moten and the intellectual project of Black Optimism.109 In short, the discussed “nothingness is not absence but foundation.”110 So how does this foundation translate into concrete political activism and something relevant to the present thesis’ field study? First, the fact that paraontology lets us see blackness as a separate entity makes it possible for activists (e.g. copwatchers) to align themselves with blackness regardless of their own status of being racialized.111 This could be seen throughout the study, in slightly different iterations.112 Further, to take a position outside of ontology can be achieved by a reconstruction of aesthetics in line with the main argument of Moten’s In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition. For instance, Moten discuss how the photograph of Emmett Till – the black fourteen-year old boy murdered in 1955 – could possibly challenge ontological questioning.113 He asks “what the hegemony of the visual” have to do with the death – and connects a critical aesthetic reading to the necessary re-construction of ontology.114 In relation to the moving image specifically, the “ante-ground” of blackness can perhaps offer a new type of aesthetics, outside of ontology.115 Following Judith Butler’s line of thought, there needs to be such an aesthetics, since “[t]he visual field is not neutral to the question of race; it is itself a racial formation, an episteme, hegemonic and forceful.116 The fact that blackness is prior to regulatory violence could make possible a certain kind of resistance and political subjectivity. This was a working hypothesis I came up with through abductive reasoning while in the field. Moten suggests that “one wants to assert the presence of something between the subjectivity that is refused [“Man”] and which one refuses and nothing, whatever that is.”117 I argue that copwatching and other acts of “looking back” have the potential to inhabit that interstitial space. This is, of course, a main topic of the thesis and is further explored in the subsequent chapters.

### 1NC---Turn

#### The music playing underneath the 1AC normalizes the neoliberal metric of value and production. The repetition of cuts and beats, and confusing of narrative are the boom and bust cycles of global capital

James 14

(Robin James- Associate Professor of Philosophy @ UNC Charlotte, From “No Future” to “Delete Yourself (You Have No Chance to Win)”: Death, Queerness, and the Sound of Neoliberalism, Journal of Popular Music Studies, Volume 25, Issue 4, p. 501-508)//TR

Introduction

Death is one of the West’s oldest philosophical problems, and it has recently been the focus of heated debates in queer theory. These debates consider the political and aesthetic function of a specific concept of death— death as negation, failure, an-arche, or creative destruction. However, as Michel Foucault (1990) argues, death is an important component of the discourse of sexuality precisely because it isn’t a type of negation. The discourse of sexuality emerges when “the ancient right to take life or let live was,” he argues, “replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault 138).1 “Sexuality is the heart and lifeblood of biopolitics” (Winnubst 2012: 79) because it—or rather, as other scholars like Laura Ann Stoler (1995), LaDelle McWhorter (2009), and Jasbir Puar (2013) have demonstrated, racialized sexuality—is one of the main instruments through which liberalism “fosters” or “disallows” life. So, insofar as it pertains to sexuality, death isn’t a negation or a subtraction of life, but a side effect of a particular style of life management. In late capitalist neoliberalism, “death” only appears indirectly, not as a challenge to or interruption of life, but as its unthinkable, imperceptible limit.2 What are the theoretical, political, and aesthetic implications of neoliberalism’s reconceptualization of death as divested, or “bare,” life?3 What if we reframe ongoing debates about queer death, futurity, and antisociality by replacing the punk metaphorics of “No Future” with the cyberpunk/digital hardcore mantra “Delete Yourself (You Have No Chance To Win)”?

Asking the question in this way, I use some methods, concepts, and problems from queer theory to think about a few pieces of music; I then use my analyses of these musical works to reflect back on that theory. Taking Atari Teenage Riot’s “Delete Yourself (You Have No Chance To Win)” as the basis for theorizing queerly racialized biopolitical death, my method involves pushing what Tavia Nyong’o calls “the fundamental and productive misprision between punk [music] and queer [theory]” (107), and what José Esteban Muñoz calls the “sticky interface between the interracial and the queer” in punk performance (93). Beginning with the role of the Sex Pistols’s (1977) “God Save the Queen” in Lee Edelman (2004) and J. Jack Halberstam’s (2010) debates about queer death and failure, I follow a musical motive (the main guitar riff) from the Pistols track to its reappearance in Atari Teenage Riot’s (ATR’s) 1995 “Delete Yourself (You Have No Chance To Win).” In this song, as in much of ATR’s work from the 1990s, overlapping (and often appropriated) queer and Afro-diasporic aesthetics condense around the idea of death or “bare life.” ATR’s musical strategies treat this death as a form of de-intensification and divestment— not, as in Edelman or the Pistols, as a form of negation (of the future or the political). I will show that ATR’s musical recontextualization of the Pistols’s riff mirrors the political recontextualization of queerness and queer death from negation to disinvestment. Pushing this misprision or sticky interface between cyberpunk, queer, and Afro-diasporic musical aesthetics, I use ATR’s music to consider how queer death might work as a political response to neoliberal demands to invest in “normal” life.

In what follows, I first discuss the traditional concept of death as negation in both the Pistols song, and in Edelman and Halberstam’s formulations. I then argue that “Delete Yourself” describes a neoliberal, biopolitical concept of death, death as carefully administered divestment. Finally, I use Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) discussion of drugs, and Ronald Bogue’s (2004) Deleuzian reading of deathmetal to identify and explain how “MIDIjunkies” and “Into the Death” complicate the biopolitical/neoliberal management of death by reworking traditional black/queer critical aesthetics. In these songs, ATR undermine biopolitical neoliberalism’s demand to invest in and intensify regular “normal” life: rather than treating death as a nadir of intensity, they intensify it–that is, they go into the death. This strategy of going “into the death” is one possible queer necropolitical response to neoliberalism.

I Wanna Be An-Arche: Death as Negation4

Because it emerged during the Enlightenment, liberal humanism has been the West’s dominant epistemic and evaluative paradigm. It organizes the world in ways that privilege the ideals of teleological development, authenticity, rationality, and autonomous agency, or choice.5 Many wellknown queer theories and theorists respond to, critique, and try to queer not “hegemony” in general, but a classically liberal conception of hegemony. For example, “no future” is a radically queer claim only in a context where teleological development and progress are hegemonic ideals (similarly, “anarchy” is radical only in response to a rigid insistence on arche). The musical structure of The Sex Pistols’s “God Save the Queen” makes this clear. This song, with its refrain, “no future,” has been central to Jack Halberstam’s critique of Lee Edelman’s 2004 book No Future, and to Halberstam’s own concept of queer failure.6 Especially because Halberstam’s primary critique of Edelman is the latter’s “excessively small archive” (Halberstam Queer Art 109), it is interesting that neither Halberstam’s initial critique nor Edelman’s response addresses the song’s music; they only discuss lyrics.7 This is a particularly narrow approach to analyzing a song. Attending to the song’s music helps to clarify some theoretical limitations of the debate about “death” and “no future” as queer rallying cries.

So what goes on, musically, in this track? Though its lack of guitar solo and stripped-down aesthetic make it a conventionally punk reaction to glammy excess, “God Save the Queen”—especially its harmony, formal composition, and instrumentation—is a rather conventional tonal rock song in the key of A. The A chord is easy to play on the guitar, hence its common use in punk songs. The song begins with a riff that plays the leading tone, G#, against the tonic, A. A very powerful and common way of creating tension, the same strategy is used in the well-known Jaws theme. This riff also concludes the song. The journey from and back to this riff includes a foray into E in the two bridges with lyrics, and into B in the instrumental bridge near the end. E is the dominant (V) of A, and B is the dominant of E. So, the song uses a lot of very conventional harmonic gestures, like modulation to the dominant, to compose an even more conventional overall song structure. Though this song might have been very different than thenmainstream radio rock, its use of tonal harmony is rooted in 200-plus years of Western musical tradition. We can thus criticize the Pistols’s music for the same flaw that Halberstam identifies in Edelman’s text: it “does not fuck the law, big or little L” (Queer Art 107). In its use of harmony, “God Save” “succumbs to the law of grammar, the law of logic” (Halberstam Queer Art 107).8 This song (like many punk songs) does not fuck the laws of tonal harmony so much as distill them to their essence.9 “God Save” isn’t musically an-archic.10

“God Save’s” conventional tunefulness distinguishes it from Edelman’s example of the sonic properties of queer death. Working from Hitchcock’s The Birds, he argues that queer death sounds like meaningless repetition, “random signals,” white noise, or “electronic buzzing.”11 Following from what he identifies as the “repetitive insistence of the sinthome (No Future 56), Edelman argues that meaningless, un(re)productive repetition is key to the critical force of queerness or, in his terms, “sinthomosexuality (No Future, 33).”Western sexual, epistemic, and aesthetic structures overemphasize “reproduction” to conceal the presence and importance of repetition. Reproductive futurity is “blin[d]” to “its own ‘automatic reiteration’ of the logic that always tops our ideological charts,” i.e., to its own compulsion to repeat and reinstall itself.12 In more Freudian terms (1927), “reproduction” is the fetishistic recognition and disavowal of “repetition.”13 For Edelman, queer death is the negation of teleological rationality, the an in an-arche. To conventionally trained Western ears, it sounds anarchic.

This is more or less the exact claim that African American Studies scholars Tricia Rose (1994) and James Snead (1981) make about the way Western music “secrets” repetition. According to Rose, Snead claims that European culture “secrets” repetition, categorizing it as progression or regression, assigning accumulation and growth or stagnation to motion, whereas black cultures highlight the observance of repetition, perceiving it as circulation, equilibrium . . . : “In European culture, repetition must be seen to be not just circulation and flow, but accumulation and growth. In black culture, the thing is there for you to pick up when you come back to get it. If there is a goal . . . it is always deferred; it continually ‘cuts’ back to the start . . . .” (69)

As Rose and Snead indicate, Afro-diasporic musics tend to foreground repetition and, rather than trying to create a sense of evolutionary continuity—what Edelman calls “the genealogy that narrative syntax labors to affirm”—use “cuts” to create loops, which are then repeated over and over again (Edelman, No Future 23.) In the same way that a DJ cuts into the breakbeat and loops it back to the beginning, sinthomosexuality is a “textual machine . . . like a guillotine,” that uses the cut to “reduc[e] the assurance of meaning in fantasy’s promise of continuity to the meaningless circulation and repetitions of the drive” (Edelman, No Future 23 and 39). The mutual privileging of repetition and “the cut” is one of the main ties between Edelman’s theory of queerness and Afro-diasporic cultural and cosmological views. The queer-critical potential of looping, cutting, and the rejection of teleo-evolutionary development is also central to J. Jack Halberstam’s work on queer/trans cinema. For example, “queer time” involves the refusal of “growing up” (subjective evolutionary development to “normal” adulthood), and the “reveal” of a transgender character breaks linear narrative development by forcing viewers to revisit prior scenes in light of new knowledge about a character’s gender identity.14 If, in white heteropatriarchial hegemony, blackness and queerness are mutually implicative, the similarities between Edelman, Halberstam, and Snead and Rose should not be surprising. They are not just responding to the same interwoven networks of privilege and oppression, but to a specific way of understanding power: “reproductive futurity” and the European ideology of teleological “accumulation and growth” are both classically liberal frameworks whose centering of wholeness, resolution, development, and assimilation encourage the elision and misconstrual of “repetition.”15 Negation is a counter-hegemonic response to this supposedly coherent arche of teleological development, accumulation, and growth. Destroying is radical only if hegemony wants you to build.

These queer, Afro-diasporic strategies of repetition, cutting, and meaningless noise are not responses to power in general; rather, they are specifically targeted critiques of a classically liberal concept of power. Sounds are meaningless, random, and “noisy” only when evaluated against a specific standard of audiological significance, logic, andmusicality.16 Noisy an-arche sounds queer and illogical only to ears tempered by a logos that privileges development, teleology, euphony, virtuosity/perfection/mastery, and rationality. Neoliberalism, however, doesn’t care about linear progress. It has a different logic, one that co-opts classically queer negation, redistributing it and putting it in the service of privileged groups. In the next section, I examine Atari Teenage Riot’s use of the Pistols’s riff from “God Save.” The riff’s musical recontextualization demonstrates that the queer/Afro-diasporic negations of classically liberal ideals of teleological arche have, in the intervening twenty years, been used to condense queer/black assemblages around a different kind of logic of death—death not as negation (the an in an-arche), but as disinvested, “bare” life.

#### This makes fascism and psychic violence inevitable via affective circulations of violence and normalization of capitalist destruction

Wiltgen 5

James Wiltgen 2005 (Professor of History and Critical Theory at CalArts, "Sado-Moneatrism or Saint Fond – Saint Ford", in Consumption in the Age of Information, ed. Cohen and Rutsky, BERG, New York, p. 107-110)//TR

How does digital capitalism intertwine with the concept of uncertainty? What key changes have taken place in the structuring of the world, via the digital and the biotechnological, what forces have emerged or coalesced, and ﬁnally, how do they affect the realm of subjectivity and consumption? Here, Arthur Kroker has transposed McLuhan into the twenty-ﬁrst century, performing an interrogation of what he calls the “digital nerve,” basically the exteriorization of the human sensorium into the digital circuitry of contemporary capitalism (Kroker, 2004: 81). This (in)formation, “streamed capitalism,” rests not exclusively on exchange value, nor material goods, but something much more immaterial, – a post market, post biological, post image society where the driving force, the “will to will,” has ushered in a world measured by probability. In other words, this variant of capitalism seeks to bind chaos by ever-increasing strictures, utilizing an axiomatic based on capture and control, with vast circuits of circulation as the primary digital architecture. This system runs on a densely articulated composition, similar to the earlier addressed concept of sado-monetarism, based upon extensive feedback loops running between exchange value and abuse value. This assemblage, however, has multiple levels, and not all are connected to the grid at the same speeds; a number of different times exist within this formation, including digital time, urban time, quotidian time, transversal time, etc. Spatially, the structure relies not on geography but “strategic digital nodes” for the core of the system, and connectivity radiates out from these nodal points (Kroker, 2004: 125). For example, a key site for these points would be the Net corporation, deﬁned as “as a self-regulating, self- reﬂexive platform of software intelligence providing a privileged portal into the digital universe” (Kroker, 2004: 140). Indeed, his mapping of digital capitalism has clear parallels with the shifts Katherine Hayles analyzes, in particular the underlying, driving mechanism whereby information severs itself from embodiment. Boredom and acquisitiveness become the principle markers of this new form of capitalism, which provides a rationale, or a new value set for the perpetual oscillation between the two poles, producing an insatiable desire for both objects and a continuing stream of fresh and intense experience. Perhaps the most densely argued assessment of capitalism, whose obvious parallel would be Marx’s Capital, is the two volumes by Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. With all the concern over the theoretical concepts developed in these books, it remains extremely important to understand the analysis as possessing a fundamental focus on the question of political economy. Capitalism forms, via its structural and affective matrix, a system capable of unparalleled cruelty and terror, and even though certain indices of well being have increased, “exploitation grows constantly harsher, (and) lack is arranged in the most scientiﬁc ways” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 373). Their framework for analysis targets the global, where the deepest law of capitalism sets limits and then repels those limits, a process well known as the concept of deterrorialization. Capitalism functions, then, by incessantly increasing the portion of constant capital, a deceptively concise formulation that has tremendous resonance for the organization of the planet – resources continually pour into the technological and machinic apparatus of capture and control, to the increased exclusion of the human component (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 466–7). In other words, it not only thrives on crisis but one of the principle deﬁnitions of capitalism would be to continually induce crisis; nostalgia for a “lost Sado-Monetarism or Saint Fond-Saint Ford 109 time” only drives these processes. The planet confronts the fourth danger, the most violent and destructive of tendencies, characterized as a turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion of abolition (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 229). Deleuze and Guattari make clear this fourth danger does not translate as a death drive, because for them desire is “always assembled,” a creation and a composition; here the task of thinking becomes to address the processes of composition. The current assemblage, then, has mutated from its original organization of total war, which has been surpassed “toward a form of peace more terrifying still,” the “peace of Terror or Survival” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 433). Accordingly, the worldwide war machine has entered a post fascist phase, where Clausewitz has been dislocated, and this war machine now targets the entire world, its peoples and economies. An “unspeciﬁed enemy” becomes the continual feedback loop for this war machine, which had been originally constituted by states, but which has now shifted into a planetary, and perhaps interstellar mode, with a seemingly insatiable drive to organize insecurity, increase machinic enslavement, and produce a “peace that technologically frees the unlimited material process of total war” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 467).7 Deleuze has analyzed these tendencies extensively in his own work, in particular with his dissection of active and reactive forces in his book on Nietzsche but also in his work on Sade and Masoch, where he points to a type of sadism that seems capable of attempting a “perpetually effective crime,” to not only destroy (pro)creation but to prevent it from ever happening again, a total and perpetual destruction, one produced by a pervasive odium fati, a hatred of fate that seeks absolute revenge in destroying life and any possible recurrence. (Deleuze, 1989: 37). This tendency far outstrips what Robert Jay Lifton has described as the “Armageddonists,” in their more commonly analyzed religious variant and in what he calls the secular type, both of which see the possibility of a “world cleansing,” preparing the way for a new world order, be it religious or otherwise (Lifton, 1987: 5–9). Embedded within the immanence of capitalism, then, one can ﬁnd forces which would make fascism seem like “child precursors,” and Hitler’s infamous Telegram 71 would be applied to all of existence, perpetually. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 467). One ﬁnal complication in terms of currently emerging subjectivities, the well-known analysis in Anti-Oedipus where capitalism, as basically driven by a certain fundamental insanity, oscillates between “two poles of delirium, one as the molecular schizophrenic line of escape, and the other as paranoiac molar investment” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 315).8 These two markers offer dramatically different possibilities for the issues of subjectivities and agency, and questions of consumption and the political can be posed within their dense and complex oscillations.

### 1NC---Turn

**Their focus on whiteness reifies racist domination—it makes whiteness a monolith and undermines opposition to racial structures**

**Andersen 3**—Margaret L. Andersen, Professor of Sociology and Women's Studies and Vice Provost for Academic Affairs at the University of Delaware, 2003, “Whitewashing Race: A Critical Perspective on Whiteness,” in White Out: The Continuing Significance of Racism, ed Doane & Bonilla-Silva, p. 28]

Conceptually, one of the major problems in the whiteness literature is the reification of whiteness as a concept, as an experience, and as an identity. This practice not only leads to conceptual obfuscation but also impedes the possibility for empirical analysis. In this literature, "whiteness" comes to mean just about everything associated with racial domination. As such, whiteness becomes a slippery and elusive concept. Whiteness is presented as any or all of the following: identity, self-understanding, social practices, group beliefs, ideology, and a system of domination. As one critic writes, "If historical actors are said to have behaved the way they did mainly because they were white, then there's little room left for more nuanced analysis of their motives and meanings" (Stowe 1996:77). And Alastair Bonnett points out that whiteness "emerges from this critique as an **omnipresent and all-powerful historical force**. Whiteness is seen to be responsible for the failure of socialism to develop in America, for racism, **for the impoverishment of humanity**. With the 'blame' comes a new kind of centering: Whiteness, and White people, are turned into the key agents of historical change, the shapers of contemporary America" (1996b:153).

Despite noting that there is differentiation among whites and warning against using whiteness as a monolithic category, most of the literature still proceeds to do so, revealing a reductionist tendency. Even claiming to show its multiple forms, most writers essentialize and reify whiteness as something that directs most of Western history (Gallagher 2000). Hence while trying to "deconstruct” whiteness and see the ubiquitousness of whiteness, the literature at the same time reasserts and reinstates it (Stowe 1996:77).

For example, Michael Eric Dyson suggests that whiteness is identity, ideology, and institution (Dyson, quoted in Chennault 1998:300). But if it is all these things, it becomes an analytically useless concept. Christine Clark and James O'Donnell write: "to reference it reifies it, to refrain from referencing it obscures the persistent, pervasive, and seemingly permanent reality of racism" (1999:2). Empirical investigation requires being able to identify and measure a concept— or at the very least to have a clear definition—but since whiteness has come to mean just about everything, it ends up meaning hardly anything.

### 1NC---Turn

#### Carceral systems subject their targets to punitive psychological warfare, bodily invasion, and neglect, anchored in a history of enslavement that can’t be recuperated for progressive ends.

Rodríguez 10, Professor at the University of California, Riverside. (Dylan, Summer 2010, “The Disorientation of the Teaching Act: Abolition as Pedagogical Position”, *The Radical Teacher*, No. 88, pg. 7-8, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/radicalteacher.1.88.0007)

The global U.S. prison regime has no precedent or peer and has become a primary condition of schooling, education, and pedagogy in every possible site. Aside from its sheer accumulation of captive bodies (more than 2.5 million, if one includes children, military captives, undocumented migrants, and the mentally ill/disordered),1 the prison has become central to the (re)production and (re)invention of a robust and historically dynamic white supremacist state: at its farthest institutional reaches, the prison has developed a capacity to organize and disrupt the most taken-for-granted features of everyday social life, including “family,” “community,” “school,” and individual social identities. Students, teachers, and administrators of all kinds have come to conceptualize “freedom,” “safety,” and “peace” as a relatively direct outcome of state-conducted domestic war (wars on crime, drugs, gangs, immigrants, terror, etc.), legitimated police violence, and large-scale, punitive imprisonment.

In what follows, I attempt to offer the outlines of a critical analysis and schematic social theory that might be useful to two overlapping, urgent tasks of the radical teacher: 1) to better understand how the prison, along with the relations of power and normalized state violence that the prison inhabits/produces, form the everyday condition of possibility for the teaching act; and 2) to engage a historically situated abolitionist praxis that is, in this moment, primarily pedagogical.

A working conception of the “prison regime” offers a useful tool of critical social analysis as well as a theoretical framework for contextualizing critical, radical, and perhaps abolitionist pedagogies. In subtle distinction from the criminological, social scientific, and common sense understandings of “criminal justice,” “prisons/ jails,” and the “correctional system,” the notion of a prison regime focuses on three interrelated technologies and processes that are dynamically produced at the site of imprisonment: first, the prison regime encompasses the material arrangements of institutional power that create informal (and often nominally illegal) routines and protocols of militarized physiological domination over human beings held captive by the state. This domination privileges a historical anti-black state violence that is particularly traceable to the latter stages of continental racial chattel slavery and its immediate epochal aftermath in “post-emancipation” white supremacy and juridical racial segregation/apartheid—a privileging that is directly reflected in the actual demography of the imprisoned population, composed of a Black majority. The institutional elaborations of this white supremacist and anti-black carceral state create an overarching system of physiological domination that subsumes differently racialized subjects (including whites) into institutional routines (strip searching and regular bodily invasion, legally sanctioned torture, ad hoc assassination, routinized medical neglect) that revise while sustaining the everyday practices of genocidal racial slavery. While there are multiple variations on this regime of physiological dominance—including (Latino/a, Muslim, and Arab) immigrant detention, extra-territorial military prisons, and asylums—it is crucial to recognize that the genealogy of the prison’s systemic violence is anchored in the normalized Black genocide of U.S. and New World nation-building.2

#### They link. The 1ac McKenzie evidence advocates for expanded use of carceral punishment and for “jailing” offenders for life

1AC Mckenzie 19 (https://sammckenziejr.medium.com/how-the-business-of-whiteness-is-the-ultimate-antitrust-violation-3d5ec1f28ae5)

The other day, I listened to my Alexa device echo back the attorney general confirmation hearing for William Barr. I heard a senator lob preschool questions at William Barr about tech companies and antitrust regulations.

Based on the senator’s leading questions, the senator believes antitrust laws are necessary to prevent companies from becoming too powerful and eliminating competition. Apparently, that’s bad for business owners, and it’s bad for the public.

As I heard the questions and answers, my face balled up and I thought, “Isn’t that what white supremacy does in America?”

The answer is yes and here are a few ways it happens:

Deals with white suppliers

Anticompetitive deals between companies and suppliers, that reduce or end competition, can increase monopolies.

In the past, America’s immigration laws created white and wanton deals with countries to maintain white majorities in America.

Those racist compacts allowed millions of white Europeans to come to a racist America while excluding other nations.

As America’s white majority declines, it’s no surprise the current battle with immigration is about the market share of whiteness in America with certain countries as the preferred suppliers.

The mergers of whiteness

Mergers by large corporations can create a monopoly too.

In the past, as whiteness merged with European immigrants, the united state of whiteness benefited by eliminating competition from Black people and people of color.

White racism enacted against Black people made it easier for new European immigrants to enter the workforce and the middle and upper classes of society.

White America exists — in its fixed and rigged position — because white America instituted, reinforced, expanded, and reiterated white supremacy through slavery, discriminatory laws, the Homestead Act, the G.I. Bill, the New Deal, and a bad host of other inhospitable policies and practices.

White supremacy has unjustly enriched white people — even poor whites relative to their counterparts — based on the merger of whiteness.

The cost of the merger of whiteness to Black people from stolen income and opportunities must be many trillions of dollars.

Price discrimination against Black people

Price discrimination involves charging different prices to different consumers.

With price discrimination, the value of a service changes depending on the buyer, and it can be illegal.

If you’re Black in America, you are more likely to die earlier, go to jail, suffer greater health disparities, make less money, and be the target of discrimination and hate crimes.

The unnecessary, disproportionate, and discriminatory price of life that Black people pay in America is exorbitant because of white supremacy.

Barriers to entry for Black people

When companies create barriers to enter the market, they can violate antitrust laws. The barriers make it impossible or unduly difficult for other companies to start and compete.

Today, the structural barriers of whiteness make it harder for Black and Brown people to compete and achieve at every level.

Those barriers include the need for multiple college degrees that do not pay off themselves.

Those barriers include hand-me-down wealth that automatically passes ill-gotten gains and material privilege to generations of white people.

Those barriers also include social and professional networks engineered and serviced by white supremacy that white employees use to get their white friends a job.

Remedies and Regulation

The word “trust” can refer to property or big business. Way back in the 90s, legal scholar Cheryl Harris described whiteness as property with all the benefits and entitlements of property ownership held by white people.

If whiteness is property, as Harris said, then whiteness is a monopoly — that’s inherently discriminatory in a white-supremacist society — and it violates the principles of antitrust laws too.

Strangely, the same Justice Department that investigates and prosecutes antitrust violations supposedly does the same with cases of discrimination.

The antitrust laws aren’t perfect; officials can underutilize and misuse them. For example, the Trump administration and his Republican accomplices want to misuse antitrust laws to punish companies they think silence “conservative voices.”

Meanwhile, white supremacy — as a conglomerate of cruelty with workers and workings — is the biggest antitrust violation in American history that continues to silence voices.

The principle of fair competition within antitrust laws should apply everywhere. If the Justice Department had eyes on every industry of white supremacy, as it does on antitrust violations, that would be better.

To overhaul the state of the union, the disparate impact principle has to be retroactive, and it must forever reign over every part of American life with militant enforcement.

The stimulated economy of white supremacy roars like a well-oiled machine. America is not a meritocracy; a white monopoly runs America.

The business of whiteness has to stop passing go and running the board. Jail it, and its outcomes for life.

In its place, set free the business of humanity that all Americans can trust.

### 1NC---Turn

#### Their call for the ballot fails to create social change, but prevents political compromise — default to debate-specific evidence

— formatting: footnotes omitted

— we don’t endorse potentially problematic language in this evidence

Ritter 13 — Michael J. Ritter (J.D. from the University of Texas School of Law), September 2013, “OVERCOMING THE FICTION OF “SOCIAL CHANGE THROUGH DEBATE”:,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Volume 2, Issue 1

WHAT’S TO LEARN FROM 2PAC’S CHANGES

In his immortal Changes, the supposedly late Tupac (2PAC) Shakur lamented, “I see no changes.” 16 2PAC expresses in Changes both his frustration with social racism and his hope for change.17 Acknowledging that race-based social inequalities would likely never completely disappear, he provocatively presented a model for improved communication and understanding to minimize racial inequalities.18 In 1999, Changes was released, topped international charts, and for many years thereafter, impressed a global audience (including The Vatican).19 Many students who participate in competitive interscholastic debate in high school and college20 frequently argue during debates that their speech acts, performances, or presentations criticizing a particular concept in a debate round could, just like 2PAC’s Changes, actually affect social inequities or issues inside and outside of the debate community. To preserve the activity, coaches and judges should discourage debaters from attempting to use—or deceiving others that they are using—competitive interscholastic debate to create social change. Those in the debate community who believe (or argue) that competitive interscholastic debate21 can reach an audience beyond the debate room, and their opponents, coaches, and judges, should consider this question: “What can I learn from 2PAC’s success in communicating his message in Changes?” Those who have wed themselves to the fiction that in-round speech acts in a competitive interscholastic debate setting can and does create actual social change (due to either some strategic reasoning or simple denial) will have a difficult time reaching the honest answer to that question: “I am wrong.” The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually incapable of creating any social change, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with nonapplicable rhetorical theory that fails to account for the unique aspects of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: “Can debate cause social change?” Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen not to prove this fundamental assumption, which—as this article argues—is merely a fiction that is harmful in most, if not all, respects. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterized as a fiction than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is not provable by any human senses or reasoning or is an assumption otherwise unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be incredibly critical of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes.

Competitive Interscholastic Debate: The Break Down

Competitive interscholastic debate is uniquely different from other types of persuasive activities. Each individual component of the term “competitive interscholastic debate” describes the essential structures of the activity from which very important precepts can be discerned. These precepts are fundamental to any application of any rhetorical theory regarding speech acts within a debate round because the precepts necessarily affect the scope of two crucial aspects of all communication: audience and purpose. The debate community’s members, many of whom are shorthand enthusiasts, simply refer to the activity as “debate.” But what that simple term omits, and what many frequently forget when uncritically accepting the “social change through debate” fiction, is any reference to the essential structures from which the community spawned: a competition of argumentation during which students from one school compete against students from other schools for the votes of judges. Therefore, before any plausible argument can be made concerning the purposes or benefits of debate, the assumptions upon which those arguments are based must be identified and explained. The following discussion (perhaps painstakingly) analyzes the essential components of competitive interscholastic debate to identify the essential precepts that debunk the assumptions relied upon by those endorsing the fiction that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change.

“Debate”

“Debate,” in its simplest and most basic form, is the presentation of seemingly inconsistent positions to convince an audience. A position could be a factual or empirical position that describes current or historical fact (e.g. A = B). The presentation of a seemingly inconsistent position to convince an audience (e.g. A ≠ B) would constitute an empirical debate about what facts are (or were) true or false (or neither). A position could also be a normative position (i.e. a position about how the way things should have been or should be (e.g. “A should not have been or should be A). The presentation of inconsistent normative positions to convince an audience (e.g. A should not or should be A) constitutes a normative debate. The intent-to-convince element is an indispensible part of any debate. Presenting apparently conflicting positions with the intent to convince requires an audience of some sort, as an audience is necessary for someone to be convinced. For instance, if a person writes an article on the propriety of the verdict in the Trayvon Martin trial to convince others that the verdict was wrong, but then no one reads it, there is no consideration of the position by the intended audience because no one (other than the author himself) could be persuaded. An audience can be as simple as a single person (e.g. having an internal debate with oneself to consider the validity of two seemingly inconsistent positions). An audience could constitute only one person when someone presents two seemingly inconsistent positions for that one-person audience to consider (e.g. an attorney advising his22 client that he has two options and presents the pros and cons of both for his client to make a decision). Two people could comprise an audience. For example, a debate could involve two people who present apparently inconsistent positions to try to convince each other of the rightness of their respective positions. A seeming or apparent inconsistency between positions is also a necessary component of a debate. If two positions are clearly consistent, then there is no debate. Conversely, an actual inconsistency is not necessary for a debate. The following hypothetical demonstrates why: Two debaters who go on a date appear to disagree over which movie, Django Unchained or Kill Bill, to see at Quinton Tarantino’s privately owned theater on Friday night at 10 p.m. This appears to be a conflict because the two cannot watch both in different theaters together at the same time. Both of them want to see the most violent Tarantino movie with a revenge theme at that time. During the exchange their arguments for why Django Unchained or Kill Bill is more violent, one debater mentions Inglorious Bastards and both agree that Inglorious Bastards is the most violent Tarantino movie with a revenge theme. Fortunately, Inglorious Bastards is also playing at the theater at the same time. Just because the two debaters did not decide between Kill Bill and Django Unchained does not mean that they did not have a debate. During their debate, they realized that their apparently conflicting positions were not actually conflicting; they had the same position—wanting to see the most violent Tarantino revenge movie. And in this example, neither audience member was convinced of either initial position. Therefore, in any “debate” there will be some audience that must resolve an apparent conflict of positions. In all communications, there is some audience. Sometimes the audience has a specific goal, such as being entertained, informed, or persuaded. The discussion about what debate “is” demonstrates that identifying the audience is essential to understanding how the context of a speech act can advance or hinder the speaker’s goals.

A Competitive Activity

A second component of competitive interscholastic debate is that it necessarily involves a competition. Not all debates must occur within the context of a competition, as the Tarantino hypothetical above suggests. But most—if not all— debates in the debate community occur either to win a debate round at a debate tournament or in preparation for winning a debate round at a debate tournament. The tournament structure is a sin qua non (a fundamental component) of the debate community. And in the very rare case that debaters host a public debate (and in the very fortunate case that an audience attends and does not leave during the first speech), the purpose is ordinarily not to convince the audience of a particular side, but to demonstrate what the school’s debate team does. At a typical tournament, there are a pre-determined number of preliminary rounds in which all entered schools’ debaters compete against debaters from other schools that have entered the tournament. The tournament usually determines beforehand the number of debaters that will advance to elimination rounds, and that number usually equals four to thirty-two teams divided into brackets (semifinals to double octafinals). If a team loses an elimination round, as the term suggests, then they are eliminated from the tournament. The prevailing team advances further into the tournament until the “winner” is left with no competitor. A hypothetically neutral critic will be assigned as a “judge.” The judge, or a panel of an odd number of judges, will vote for the debaters who they believe won the debate by doing “the better debating.” Many judges have written paradigms; and the vast majority of written paradigms express a preference for how the debate should occur, but express little or no concern about what (in terms of content) is argued. In almost all debate rounds, the judge will make his decision based on how the debate occurs, not based on what persuaded the judge. A primary (and probably the best) example of this point is a “dropped” argument. Many debate rounds are won, not on the basis of the persuasiveness of an argument, but because the opponents failed to directly respond to the argument. Judges will ordinarily permit the opponent to then “blow up the impact” of this drop in the following speech. Thus, the competitive nature of debate causes, to a great degree, the how to precede the what (unless the point is immaterial or nonessential). As a result, many judges divorce their human experiences and logical reasoning skills of objectively evaluating the persuasiveness of an argument from the decision of which team to vote for. And even when there is a “point-for-point and warrant-for-warrant” debate, many judges will vote based on who does the better job (technically speaking) extending and explaining the argument (even if the argument is atrociously absurd). The target audience is solely the judge, and the sole issue the judge must decide is which side “did the better debating.” Mandatory switch-side debating confirms that the debaters themselves are not the audience for persuasion. And because fair opportunity is valued when there are winners and losers in competitions, most judges approach their paradigms with an attempt to be objective. Tournaments hire judges to objectively evaluate debates based on direct language from the ballot, the ballot the judge must sign his or her name to: who did the “better debating” or who “won the round” (which is a rephrasing of who did the better debating). Competitive debate is a very narrow slice of “debate.” One could persuasively argue that competitive debate barely qualifies as “debate” because the target audience (the judge) is persuaded not by the truth of an argument, but who “does the better debating.” Hence, the only point on which the judge of a competitive debate is seeking to be persuaded of is who to vote for. This conclusion narrows the previous section’s conclusions regarding “debate” (generally) because the “competition” element narrows the audience in the debate to the judge, not the competitors. The debaters are not competing to be persuaded. They are competing to persuade. And the only issue on which the audience—the judge—is asked to resolve is which competitors did the better debating. The judges are not present to objectively evaluate the content of messages and arguments for their persuasive value outside of the narrow issue of who did the better debating.

An Interscholastic Activity

The final essential component of competitive interscholastic debate is that students from different schools compete against each other at debate tournaments. Many academics who have spent decades competing in and coaching debate have probably never encountered an intrascholastic debate competition, at least not in any of the formats in the debate community. The interscholastic element further narrows “competitive debate” to a student activity that faces resource constraint (e.g. time, budget, rooms available, etc.). Perhaps, noting that the competitive debates are interscholastic highlights the more important point about what competitive student debate is not: “academic debate” or “public debate.” The interscholastic element determines how the competitive debates take place. Generally, several factors constrain interest in and participation on a school’s debate team. First, a school likely could not afford to send every enrolled student to travel to and register in debate tournaments. Even if some schools could afford this, not all could. But even the possibility of all schools’ students would be problematic in terms of one school making up more than half of the field. And even if all schools could afford to send all students to a debate competition, debate tournaments likely could not occur (perhaps, only during the summer) because debate tournaments would last several weeks. The tournament structure means that only a select few will be included in the first place to compete, and as tournaments progress, more and more debaters are excluded. Because only a limited number of teams can be sent to tournaments, coaches must decide who “makes the team” and which teams go to what tournaments. But these decisions (while they could be made for a good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all) will likely be influenced by a student’s natural ability or potential to become skilled at how to do our community’s particular formats of competitive debate. And because teams generally can and do not compete against other teams from their schools, a competitive interscholastic debate will result in one school advancing over the other whose chances of advancing then diminish if not disappear altogether. Finally, the interscholastic nature of competitive interscholastic debate is a point of differentiation from other types of competitive debates: the debaters are all students from different schools. They are either in college or high school. This distinguishes competitive interscholastic debate from other types of debate— particularly academic debate. High schoolers are generally still developing physically and mentally, as well as start developing intellectually. Most college students continue their intellectual development as they obtain their associate’s or bachelor’s degrees. It is not until students begin studying for a master’s, law, or doctoral degree that they must study a particular field in depth, reading publications from academics in their respective fields. Many former competitive interscholastic debaters must, for the first time, become familiar with the academics in the particular field for the sole purpose of learning, not “cutting cards” for debate. It is at the end of a master’s studies or PhD program that students finally must contribute something novel within their particular field of study that contributes something to that field of study. This is the point at which students have made an academic contribution (assuming that what is written is selected for publication). Thus, competitive interscholastic debate is radically different from every other kind of debate. It is not “academic debate,” and it is not “public debate.”23 Because schools’ resources limit debate participation, it is necessarily an exclusive activity to which no students have the right to participate in. And without accounting for how the structures unique to competitive interscholastic debate—exclusion, competition, a limited audience, very narrow audience purpose, etc.—affect the application of a general communications or rhetorical theory in this specific context, the application should be reconsidered or viewed highly skeptically if not outright rejected.

Let’s Talk 2PAC

To illustrate many of the reasons why “social change through debate” is a fiction, consider the question posed in the introduction: “How did 2PAC’s Changes reach a substantial and diverse cross-section of a global audience?” Any reader who picked up on the humor of the “supposedly-late” descriptor above would immediately know that it is a trick question: 2PAC didn’t make any impression by releasing Changes in 1999; 2PAC died in 1996. 2PAC’s estate contracted with players in the music industry to produce Changes by splicing together several of 2PAC’s pre-death recordings, and released Changes in 1999. The song was advertised and played on the radio and CD players internationally. The similarities and differences between 2PAC when recording Changes and a student arguing that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change are informative. Although 2PAC wrote and recorded parts of Changes, several other individuals in a very complex series of transactions and communications were responsible for the song’s global successes. When 2PAC recorded the various parts of Changes, he merely spoke and sang words into a microphone in a recording studio where the audience was solely concerned with operating equipment for quality assurance purposes. Similarly, a debater who is asserting that debate can cause social change, like 2PAC in a recording studio, is speaking to an audience who typically cares little (if at all) about the debater’s intended message and cares about recording it “on the flow.” But unlike 2PAC’s audience (that likely had solely a financial interest in re-communicating 2PAC’s message), the judge generally does not re-communicate the debater’s message for any persuasive purpose, and the judge usually has little or no interest or incentive to do so.24 Changes’s commercial context is part of what allowed the song to spread worldwide. Those initially re-communicating 2PAC’s message did so for financial reasons; the fact that 2PAC’s message was concerned with minimizing racial inequalities likely contributed only a limited extent to the song’s success. Pys’s Gangnam Style had similar success at reaching a global audience, and it made fun of Korean culture. What Changes, Gangnam Style (both messages disseminated in a commercial context), and debate (a competitive activity and, yet ironically, one increasingly marked by anti-capitalist sentiments) have in common is that form is so much more important than substance. But the difference between the form of international hit songs and debate is that the form of musical productions—with a catchy tune, visually stimulating music video, and sometimes a valuable message—makes the message appealing to a general audience. The form of modern competitive interscholastic debate—with, at its worse, rapid fire spreading of dense philosophical verbiage or personal attacks tangentially related (at best) to the topic—is simply unappealing to a general audience. If anything, the form in which messages are communicated in competitive interscholastic debate repels audiences outside of the community. To the extent that Changes was made more popular by its message, the crucial difference between the message of Changes and messages communicated in a debate round is that the in original production of Changes, and the recommunication of that original message, the message has never changed (save some remixes) or contradicted itself. The original version of Changes was the same as it was when it was released until (and after) the time that it made the Pope’s playlist. Conversely, debaters who communicate messages in a debate round will, almost always, contradict their argument (again for persuasive reasons, not because they were convinced that they were wrong initially) in another round, read a different part of the card they were reading previously, reading different phrasings of the same argument by a different author, etc. Therefore, the message-repetition element is missing from competitive interscholastic debate. The multiple points of distinction between 2PAC’s Changes and messages made in debate rounds demonstrate why the dissemination of messages outside of a debate round for persuasive purposes is highly unlikely.

The Kicker

As the question, “How did 2PAC reach a substantial and diverse cross-section of that global audience?” was trick question, so (to some extent) was this article’s initial question: “What can I learn from 2PAC’s success in communicating his message in Changes?” While one lesson we can learn from the success 2PAC’s changes concerns the factors that make messages more likely to be disseminated worldwide, there is pretty much nothing else to learn in terms of persuasion in the context of competitive interscholastic debate. Up to this point, this article has shown how each of the essential components of “competitive interscholastic debate” makes it very different from any other kind of debate. But one thing that is persuasive in any kind of debate is some sort of properly conducted study (or even a mere survey) that provides empirical proof or even substantial anecdotal support. To date, none of the many academics who coach or participate in the debate community have published a study or survey to support the social change fiction. (Perhaps they have tried, and discovered they were just wrong.) But until such an empirical study of competitive interscholastic debate is conducted, students, judges, and coaches should not take it for granted. Similarly, no one has studied whether 2PAC’s Changes had any effect on people’s attitudes toward racial equality. (Thus, it would be equally supported to say that 2PAC’s Changes increased racial violence.) No survey or statistical studies have been conducted, constrained by academic standards, and then published, that suggest that 2PAC’s Changes had any real effect on anyone (other than the objectively measurable effect that purchasing the song had on the buyer’s wallet). Similarly, no one has studied whether any individual debate round, a team’s year-long “project,” or a debate team’s seemingly perpetual social campaign has created any social change regarding the position they support. While it is theoretically possible that someone has listened to 2PAC and thought to himself, “Hmm , perhaps I should not be so racist,” it is as equally possible that, according to the arguments of Judith Butler or Jacques Derrida (or insert any other philosophy academic or rhetorical theorist—from Aristotle to Slavoj Žižek—here), debate has created some sort of social change. The problem is that nothing supports that debate rounds can create social change other than the adage, “Anything is possible.” The reasoning that debate can create social change is circular at its best. The absurdity is that judges prefer specific, predictive, and empirical evidence over general theoretical possibilities in almost every single context except when it comes to attempts to use debate to create social change. Bald theoretical assertions with flowery language from philosophers are accepted over uncarded but logical analytical arguments. Any explanation for why coaches and students (at least pretend to) believe that debate can create social change would require an unacceptable degree of speculation. The bottom line is that the proposition that competitive interscholastic debate will (or more accurately, can) result in social change is merely speculation without any logical or empirical support.

Overcoming the Fiction

Merely identifying a proposition as a fiction is insufficient to merit its abandonment. This article uses the term “fiction” because the idea that debate rounds could likely create any social change is, in all meanings of the term, a fiction. A fiction is a conclusion that is feigned, invented, or imagined. It is an imaginary thing or event, postulated for the purposes of argument or explanation. One can distinguish a fiction from a statement of fact (which can be determined true or false) or a scientific hypothesis (a falsifiable theory answering a posed question). A fiction, on the other hand, is something that is either false or has not been attempted to be proven true. A fiction is neither inherently good nor inherently bad. Rather, it is a tool to achieve some other purpose. Fictional stories frequently convey a moral to be extracted or lesson to be learned.25 In law, a legal fiction is a legal rule that is known to be factually false (such as the legal fiction that all people are presumed to know the law) that is endorsed for some greater public policy purpose (such as to avoid ignorance and discourage intentionally avoiding knowledge of the law). After identifying whether a proposition is a fiction (or a truth or hypothesis), determining whether the fiction is worthwhile requires weighing the pros and cons of the fiction against the purposes of the context in which it is used.

The Fiction

The idea or proposition that competitive interscholastic debate can result in social change is properly characterized as a fiction because it is false and has not been proven true. The proposition that debate rounds can create social change is a fiction because it is false on a theoretical level. Those who attempt to apply theories about academic debate (i.e. arguments published in books and journals by PhDs who argue about concepts within their respective fields of study), social movements, rhetorical acts, and performances are not discussing competitive interscholastic debate. Philosophers and rhetorical theorists have never written an article or book using competitive interscholastic debate as an example of the effectiveness of a communication strategy (at least not successes outside of a debate round). Their theories draw upon historical (i.e. anecdotal) examples to demonstrate their theories. None of them have ever cited a debate round or “debate movement” as an example of their theories.26 Those who attempt to apply academic theories to competitive interscholastic debate (primarily communications academics, who also frequently happen to be participants in the debate community), decontextualize the broader theories to apply them to competitive interscholastic debate without adequately accounting for the competitive and interscholastic structures of competitive interscholastic debate. 27 Although some “competition” is part of any debate, this part is more accurately described as the presence of seemingly conflicting positions, which is discussed above and exemplified by the Tarantino hypothetical. In social movements or public debate, there are two (or more) apparently conflicting positions. Competitive interscholastic debate is uniquely different because there is not a possibility for compromise on the ultimate question of who did the better debating; most tournaments prohibit double wins, and no debaters would agree to a double loss. The competition is absolute; one side must win and one side must lose. This is radically different from the ability of individuals to be persuaded by the other side of a social movement. The switching of sides outside of the debate context comes from a person’s willingness to be persuaded by a particular position; it is not forced by tournament rules. Thus, the competitive structures of competitive interscholastic debate render the applicability of philosophical or rhetorical theory inapplicable to the extent that it does not account for particular competitive interscholastic debate context. The unique structures of debate rounds rob all arguments or positions therein (or in a series of rounds) of any persuasive value beyond the very narrow issue of “which side did the better debating.” The competitive element and tournament structure of competitive interscholastic debate taint all positions proffered in a debate round to create social change with a stench of “I am actually lying about my goals; I am clearly just using this argument to win the ballot.” Even debates about how debates should proceed (i.e. theory arguments or arguments about the practices in debate, or “meta-debate” (debates about debate)) are not proffered for the truth of the proposition, but to win the debate. The audience—only the judge—is solely concerned with the ultimate question: “Which side did the better debating?” Competitive interscholastic debate is certainly a venue in which students can become aware of societal issues and topics of concern. But the persuasive value of arguments presented in a debate round to convince debaters of the truth of either side on a topic is virtually nil.28 Students will generally form opinions about issues they learn about in a debate round outside of their debate rounds. The issues debaters become aware of include issues external to debate (e.g. affirmative action, foreign policy) and issues internal to debate (e.g. theory, community issues). When debaters choose to bring those issues into a debate round, they necessarily use those issues as a competitive means to the ultimate end of convincing the judge that they did the better debating. This requires the opposing team to adopt a competitive counterstrategy to that position; it forecloses the option of the opposing team being fully persuaded by the other team’s position. Even an attempt to “compromise” via a permutation (as a competitive strategy rather than a persuasive position) will meet vigorous, usually pre-scripted opposition. As a result, any in-round action (whether a speech act or the judge voting for one team or the other) will have no out-of-round effect consistent with or contemplated by any cited authors or postulated by the high school or college student making the assertion. Even arguments about competitive interscholastic debate—primarily theory and issues about inequalities in the debate community—will necessarily lose all persuasive value about those particular issues when they are raised in a debate round. Although more specific to competitive interscholastic debate and not general theories about academic debate, meta-debate loses its power to convince anyone

in the round because the audience—only the judge—is solely concerned with the question of “which team did the better debating.” Theory and arguments about “social issues in debate” made in a debate inherently reek of disingenuousness. Most debaters and judges do not even consider adopting a position on the meta-debate until after the round in reflective discussion and thought about the issue, thought that never incorporates the truthfulness of an argument because “it was dropped” in a debate round. In the particular debate, the result is always based on who, in the judge’s opinion, did the better debating. It is not based on who convinced the judge of some proposition irrelevant to deciding which team did the better debating. The preceding discussion demonstrates why arguments about social change— even social change within the debate community—have persuasive value only outside of a debate round. The debate community has developed multiple forums in which members of the community engage in noncompetitive and, sometimes, academic debate on issues within the debate community. These include discussions before and after rounds with judges, teammates, and competitors; on forums or online message boards; or in academic publications. For the social issues external to the debate community, there are almost an unlimited number of ways that students form opinions. And, after students form their opinions and join causes and organizations, there are about an equal number of non-competitive ways that students can use techniques and modes of persuasion discussed by academics and rhetorical theories. Debate rounds, at the very most, operate as venue solely for raising awareness about social issues and debate practices. It would be illogical to conclude that, because issues were debated in a particular debate and out-of-round discussion about that practice followed, the in-round debate created a social change. Because coaches and students strategically consider their arguments and practices prior to a debate round, the social issues or the “concern” about a debate tactic initially spawns outside of debate rounds, not from within a singular debate round. And just because one event occurred before another does not make the former the cause of the latter. To the extent that the in-round practice causes a subsequent out-of-round discussion, debate is admittedly a form for raising awareness about practices and social issues for students. But the arguments presented in the debate round will lack persuasive value in the round insofar as convincing the judge or other audience members of anything beyond the ultimate question of who did the better debating. But even if this article’s arguments up to this point have no validity, and creating social change through debate rounds is more likely than just theoretically possible, this is insufficient to adopt the proposition that competitive interscholastic debate creates social change. It remains a fiction because no academics—not even those who have remained in the debate community for decades—have attempted to prove its validity with any form of study or survey. No studies or surveys have been conducted on any particular application of philosophical or rhetorical theory to the practices within competitive interscholastic debate. Thus, competitive interscholastic debates and meta-debates therein claiming to create some sort of change either within the community or outside the community have no empirical support. They simply present the possibility, but fail to show any probability of success. Because any critically thinking person (in or out of the debate community) should be hesitant to presume probability based on mere possibility, the probability of the general theory being applicable in the competitive interscholastic debate context should be presumed to be zero, as no probability has been proven. Although practices have certainly evolved, no empirical study has causally linked this evolution to in-round arguments to the exclusion of out-of-round, non-competitive discussions.

Why We Should Get Over This Fiction

Fictions are neither inherently good nor inherently bad. Fictions must be judged based on whether they serve some relevant purpose to the context in which the fiction is adopted. The legal fiction that all people are presumed to know the law is one such fiction. If no one follows laws, then passing laws is pointless. Therefore, compliance with the law is fundamental. The fiction that people are presumed to know the law encourages individuals to know the law and increases compliance. If individuals can shield themselves from the ramifications of violating the law by not knowing the law, people would be encouraged to avoid learning about the law to excuse or justify non-compliance. A sound methodology for determining whether a fiction is good or bad must include: (1) an identification of whether the proposition is a fiction; (2) what the purposes of the context, field, or activity that is considering adoption of the fiction; and (3) whether the fiction advances or hinders those purposes. Up until this point, this article has argued why it is a fiction to believe that debate rounds cause social change. And, as was discussed at length in Nix the Nixonism: Identifying the Purposes of Debate by Understanding Constituency, Transparency & Accountability, the primary purposes of debate are self-preservation and “o promote skills including public speaking, researching, and critical thinking as judged by the larger academic community and the general public.29 Thus, deciding whether to dispense with the fiction of “social change through debate” is a worthwhile endeavor will require determining whether this fiction promotes or hinders the self-preservation of the community and promotes skills including public speaking, research, and critical thinking. Although either maintaining or dispensing with the fiction would likely be neutral with respect to promoting public speaking, researching, and critical thinking skills, the fiction continues to deal damaging blows to the debate community. These damaging effects can be shown anecdotally. The fiction has damaged the legitimacy of the debate community by encouraging a race to the bottom in terms of debaters—in a competitive flurry—trying to outdo each other and themselves. The best examples of this are in college policy debate, which has existed for much longer than any other interscholastic debate format in the U.S. The development of the “kritik” opened possibilities for deployment of a new body of literature in rounds. The race to the bottom has caused the debate community’s acceptance of the following in-round tactics: stripping nude to de-mystify the female body; dance-offs; defecating into a bag to face our waste; simulating an abortion; actual in round violence between debate partners to illustrate and dramatize domestic violence; voting down white debaters because they were white in order to promote minority participation in competitive interscholastic debate; and debating with the lights off, performatively conserving energy. Those outside of the debate community in academic and professional circles have noticed this downward trend in competitive interscholastic debate. As a result of this trend, debate is currently viewed as having diminished pedagogical value in terms of public speaking, research, and critical thinking. This presents a very real threat to the existence of schools’ debate programs.30 A possible advantage of adopting the fiction is that if students believe in the persuasive power of their positions, then they would be more likely to recommunicate the message in non-competitive formats outside of the competitive interscholastic debate community. Not only has this argument been empirically disproven, the opposite has proven to be true. Most debaters are involved in few, if any, other extra-curricular activities. Sometimes debate programs discourage participation in other activities to hone skills unique to competitive interscholastic debate (e.g. spreading). Furthermore, to the extent that debaters are convinced of their own argument that debate can create social change, the fiction discourages participation in more effective methods of persuasion that do not require the participants to contradict themselves. Students are led to believe that they have accomplished something when, in fact, they have contributed nothing (except to the decline of the community). Additionally, arguing that debate can create social change by the judge voting for the argument is also unethical. The fiction of social change through debate is powerful because it abuses debate’s structures designed to ensure fairness and minimize arbitrariness in judges’ decision-making. One primary structure is the contractual requirement that when the judges sign their ballots, they are voting for the team that does the better debating, as they have contracted with the tournament to do so. When the judge agrees with the host school to judge, he has promised to vote for the debaters who do the better debating. An argument that voting for one team over the other solely because of some out-of-round benefit compromises the judge’s objectivity of evaluating who did the better debating through the arguments made in the particular debate round. In essence, it is a promise for a benefit outside of the debate round in exchange for the ballot that would outweigh the judge’s sense of duty to remain objective and decide the round on who did the better debating. In this sense, endorsing the fiction of social change through debate is, by definition, is endorsing bribery. The only way this ethical dilemma would not exist would be for debaters relying on the fiction to admit that there really is no out-of-round benefit, which is this article’s ultimate point. Not only does the fiction unfairly place the judge in an ethical dilemma, it is also unfair by asking the judge to consider and accept out-of-round benefits of voting for a particular team but ignore all of the judge’s and other debaters’ personal outof-round experiences. In debate rounds, judges attempt to adopt neutral, objective paradigms by not disregarding an argument simply because they personally disagree or do not like it. The general motivation for this is to be fair to the students and allow them an opportunity to succeed despite the judge’s idiosyncratic preferences, the full disclosure of which would take too long to explain prior to a debate or write in a paradigm (although some judges definitely try). The fiction of social change through debate invites the judge to insert his or her subjective preferences only to the extent the judge personally agrees. If the judge personally disagrees with the team’s particular social goals, the judge will be shunned by rejecting the team’s argument absent some argument that the opposing team wins “on the flow.” But if the judge personally agrees with the team’s particular social goals (or at least what the debaters purport their social goals to be), then the debaters relying on the fiction of social change through debate invites and attempts to justify judges’ intervention only to the extent it benefits them even if the argument is not won “on the flow.” This is true because arguments about what the ballot can would, if the argument is true (or dropped), outweigh a technically bad performance by the debaters relying on those arguments. By placing the judge in an ethical dilemma, bribing the judge, and inviting and justifying one-sided intervention, the fiction of social change through debate encourages debaters to commit the ultimate in-round abuse. Arguments and strategies are not, by themselves, properly considered unfair or abusive to another debater. There are always counter-arguments and counter-strategies. Tactics—or the in-round conduct of debaters—can be unfair and abusive. For example, card clipping (purporting to read the entirety of a card but only reading part of it), hiding the other team’s evidence, name-calling, promising the judge money or job in exchange for voting for a particular team, blanket refusal to answer questions in cross-examination, and other rule violations (meaning the actual rules of the debate tournament or the organization under which the tournament is conducted) are all examples of tactics that are unfair and abusive. These tactics and the fiction of social change through debate place the judge in an ethical dilemma, bribe the judge with out-of-round compensation to vote for a team who does not do the better debating, and invite and justify one-sided intervention. They compromise the integrity of the activity and are thus the ultimate unfair tactics and the worst forms of in round abuse. The fiction of social change through debate abuses the win–loss structure of debate and permits debaters to otherize, demonize, dehumanize, and exclude opponents. The win–loss structure of debate rounds requires a judge to vote for one side or the other, as judges generally cannot give a double win. This precludes the possibility of compromise on any major position in the debate when the resolution of the position would determine the ultimate issue of “which team did the better debating.” Thus, the fiction of social change through debate encourages debaters to construct narratives of good versus evil in which the other team is representative of some evil that threatens to bring about our destruction if it is endorsed (e.g. capitalism). The team relying on the fiction of social change through debate then paints themselves as agents of the good, and gives the judge a George W. Bush-like “option”: “You’re either with us or you’re against us.” The fiction of social change through debate—like Bush’s rhetorical fear tactics and creation of a false, polarizing, and exclusionary dichotomy to justify all parts of the War on Terror—enables the otherization, demonization, dehumanization, and exclusion of the opposing team. When the unfairness of this tactic is brought to light—particularly in egregious situations when a team is arguing that the other team should lose because of their skin color—all can see that the debate centers on personal attacks against opposing debaters. This causes tensions between debaters that frequently result in debaters losing interest or quitting. By alienating and excluding members of the competitive interscholastic debate community for the purpose of winning a debate, it also makes the reaching of any compromise outside of the debate—the only place where compromise is possible—much less likely. By bringing the social issue into a debate round, debaters impede out-of-round progress on the resolution of social issues within and outside the debate community by prompting backlash. Finally, the fiction of social change through debate teaches debaters to engage in unethical tactics that justify—and, if those students then become government leaders or corporate executives, could result in—the tactics used by oppressive governments and corrupt corporations to maintain their positions of power. One such unethical tactic is requiring a person to make a decision in a limited amount of time based solely on a limited amount of biased or false information. North Korea, for example, campaigns for support with propaganda and lies, and then forcefully limits its people’s access to other sources of information. Nazi Germany also used comparable propaganda tactics to convince people of the superiority of an Aryan race. Corrupt corporations similarly scam consumers by presenting misleading and biased information and falsely promising great benefits after the consumer hands over his monetary endorsement. The fiction of social change through debate encourages these same tactics in a debate round and teaches students that these tactics are effective and rewarding. It places the judge in the position of supporting or rejecting a particular cause based on very limited information presented in a single debate round. It frequently requires the judge to act based solely on the particular, biased information presented by the debaters. The possibility of the other side presenting counterarguments is inadequate because debate teams purposefully research arguments to run that other debate teams likely do not have specific responsive evidence to. Furthermore, by requiring the judge to decide in the debate round whether to support or reject a cause, debaters seek to limit the judge’s access to other sources of information that would enable the judge to come to an informed decision. Thus, arguments made in a debate round are not the driving force convincing students of those arguments. It is the competitive tactics and strategies that students that are positively reinforced with the ballot that the debate community should be concerned about.

Conclusion

The idea that speech acts in a debate round can create social change is a fiction. The successes of 2PAC’s Changes demonstrate that communication and persuasive attempts in competitive interscholastic debate is entirely different from all other forms of persuasive communication that have been successful at reaching a broad audience. The fiction of social change through debate undermines the fundamental purposes of the competitive interscholastic debate activity— primarily self-preservation and the development of skills. It encourages tactics that undermine the prevalent values endorsed in the community (fairness, education, objectivity, ethics, morality, etc.) and tactics that mirror the most commonly criticized notions (unjust governments, corporate abuse, capitalism etc.). It is long past time for academics in our community who endorse the fiction of social change through debate to prove it by publishing some sort of valid academic study or survey. Despite the past decades of in-round argumentation that debate can create social change, one must lament, “I see no changes,” at least none for the better.

# 2NC

### 2NC ⁠— Cards

#### The TVA is the best way to create “black radicalism”

Moten 13, (Fred Moten, October 2013, “Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh),” The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 112, Issue 4, pp. 777-779, DOI:10.1215/00382876-2345261)

We should be no less forthright in recognizing that such positionality is the desire that Fanon admits, if only, perhaps, to disavow, when he conducts his philosophical investigations of the lived experience of the black. Two questions arise: Does he disavow it? Or is it, in its necessity, the very essence of what Wilderson calls “our black capacity to desire”? Certain things about the first few paragraphs of Fanon’s phenomenological analysis seem clearer to me now than when I was composing “The Case of Blackness” (Moten 2008). The desire to attain transcendental subjectivity’s self-regard is emphatic even if it is there primarily to mark an interdiction, an antagonism, a declivity, a fall into the deadly experiment that will have been productive of “a genuine new departure” (Fanon 2008: xii), the end of the world and the start of the general dispossession that will have been understood as cost and benefit. But that desire returns, as something like the residual self-image of the phenomenologist that he wants to but cannot be, to enunciate the (political) ontology he says is outlawed, in what he would characterize as the neurotic language of the demand, called, as he is, to be a witness in a court in which he has no standing, thereby requiring us to reconsider, by way of and beyond a certain Boalian turn, what it is to be a specta(c)tor. Elsewhere, I misleadingly assert, Fanon is saying that there is no and can be no black social life. I now believe he says that is all there can be (Moten 2008: 177). The antephenomenology of spirit that constitutes Black Skin, White Masks prepares our approach to sociological or, more precisely, sociopoetic grounding, as Du Bois, say, or later Walter Rodney would have it, by way of the description of the impossibility of political life, which is, nevertheless, at this moment and for much of his career, Fanon’s chief concern. The social life of the black, or of the colonized, is, to be sure, given to us in or through Fanon, often in his case studies, sometimes in verse, or in his narrative of the career of the revolutionary cadre. It is as if Fanon is there to remind us that the lunatic, the (revolutionary) lover, and the poet are of imagination all compact. They occupy and are preoccupied with a zone of the alternative, the zone of nonbeing (antic disposition’s tendency to cut and displace organic position) that asks and requires us to consider whether it is possible to differentiate a place in the sun, a promised land, a home—or merely a place and time—in this world, from the position of the settler. Is it possible to desire the something other than transcendental subjectivity that is called nothing? What if blackness is the name that has been given to the social field and social life of an illicit alternative capacity to desire? Basically, that is precisely what I think blackness is. I want it to be my constant study. I listen for it everywhere. Or, at least, I try to. If I read Sexton correctly, after trying to get underneath the generous severity of his lesson, he objects, rightly and legitimately, to the fact that in the texts he cites I have not sufficiently looked for it in the Afro-pessimistic texts toward which I have sometimes gestured. In the gestures I have made here I hope I have shown what it is that I have been so happy to find, that projection or relay or amplification carried out by the paraontological imagination that animates and agitates Afro-pessimism’s antiregulatory force. Black optimism and Afro-pessimism are asymptotic. Which one is the curve and which one is the line? Which is the kernel and which is the shell? Which one is rational, which one is mystical? It doesn’t matter. Let’s just say that their nonmeeting is part of an ongoing ~~manic depressive~~ episode called black radicalism / black social life. Is it just a minor internal conflict, this intimate nonmeeting, this impossibility of touching in mutual radiation and permeation? Can pessimists and optimists be friends? I hope so. Maybe that’s what friendship is, this bipolarity, which is to say, more precisely, the commitment to it. To say that we are friends is to say that we want to be friends. I want to try to talk about the nature and importance of the friendship I want, that I would like us to have, that we are about to have, that in the deepest sense we already more than have, which is grounded in and enabled by that commitment even as it is continually rethought and replayed by way of our differences from one another, which is held within and holds together our commonness. The difference has to do with the proper calibration of this bipolarity. Sexton is right to suggest that the far too simple opposition between pessimism and optimism is off, and that I was off in forwarding it, or off in forwarding an imprecision that made it seem as if I were, having been seduced by a certain heuristic and its sound, thereby perhaps inadvertently seducing others into mistaking an alternating current for a direct one. The bipolarity in question is, at every instance, way too complicated for that, and I really want you to hear what we’ve been working on, this under-riff we’ve been trying to play, to study, to improvise, to compose in the hyperreal time of our thinking and that thinking’s desire. There is an ethics of the cut, of contestation, that I have tried to honor and illuminate because it instantiates and articulates another way of living in the world, a black way of living together in the other world we are constantly making in and out of this world, in the alternative planetarity that the intramural, internally differentiated presence—the (sur)real presence—of blackness serially brings online as persistent aeration, the incessant turning over of the ground beneath our feet that is the indispensable preparation for the radical overturning of the ground that we are under.

#### Rejection of political engagement is too pessimistic

Moten 13, (Fred Moten, October 2013, “Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh),” The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 112, Issue 4, pp. 737-740, DOI:10.1215/00382876-2345261)

Just Friends

In the past decade, the most exciting and generative advance in black critical theory, which is to say critical theory, is the announcement and enactment of Afro-pessimism in the work of Frank B. Wilderson III and Jared Sexton. Black study such as theirs refreshes lines of rigorously antidisciplinary in(ter)vention, effecting intellectual renewal against academic sterility. When wardens of established disciplines and advocates of interdisciplinary reform fight to secure depleted sovereignty in and over the same depleted real estate—whose value increases as its desertification progresses; whose value is set by the new masters of another form of what Thomas Jefferson called silent profit—and when note of this false alternative is taken by those who offer nothing but a critique of the very idea of a true one, Wilderson and Sexton keep on pushing over the edge of refusal, driven by a visionary impetus their work requires and allows us to try to see and hear and feel. This essay is dedicated to Sexton’s and Wilderson’s work, out of love for the common project, out of love for such rigorous devotion to the common project, out of love for black people, out of love for blackness. I have thought long and hard, in the wake of their work, in a kind of echo of Bob Marley’s question, about whether blackness could be loved; there seems to be a growing consensus that analytic precision does not allow for such a flight of fancy, such romance, but I remain under the impression, and devoted to the impression, that analytic precision is, in fact, a function of such fancy. And this, perhaps, is where the tension comes, where it is and will remain, not in spite of the love but in it, embedded in its difficulty and violence, not in the impossibility of its performance or declaration but out of the exhaustion that is their condition of possibility. More to the point, if Afro-pessimism is the study of this impossibility, the thinking that I have to offer (and I think I’m as reticent about the term black optimism as Wilderson and Sexton are about Afro-pessimism, in spite of the fact that we make recourse to them) moves not in that impossibility’s transcendence but rather in its exhaustion. Moreover, I want to consider exhaustion as a mode or form or way of life, which is to say sociality, thereby marking a relation whose implications constitute, in my view, a fundamental theoretical reason not to believe, as it were, in social death. Like Curtis Mayfield, however, I do plan to stay a believer. This is to say, again like Mayfield, that I plan to stay a black motherfucker. Over the course of this essay, we’ll have occasion to consider what that means, by way of a discussion of my preference for the terms life and optimism over death and pessimism and in the light of Wilderson’s and Sexton’s brilliant insistence not only upon the preferential option for blackness but also upon the requirement of the most painstaking and painful attention to our damnation, a term I prefer to wretchedness, after the example of Miguel Mellino, not simply because it is a more literal translation of Fanon (though often, with regard to Fanon, I prefer the particular kinds of precision that follow from what some might dismiss as mistranslation) but also because wretchedness emerges from a standpoint that is not only not ours, that is not only one we cannot have and ought not want, but that is, in general, held within the logic of im/possibility that delineates what subjects and citizens call the real world (Mellino 2013). But this is to say, from the outset, not that I will advocate the construction of a necessarily fictive standpoint of our own but that I will seek to begin to explore not just the absence but the refusal of standpoint, to actually explore and to inhabit and to think what Bryan Wagner (2009: 1) calls “existence without standing” from no standpoint because this is what it would truly mean to remain in the hold of the ship (when the hold is thought with properly critical, and improperly celebratory, clarity). What would it be, deeper still, what is it, to think from no standpoint; to think outside the desire for a standpoint? What emerges in the desire that constitutes a certain proximity to that thought is not (just) that blackness is ontologically prior to the logistic and regulative power that is supposed to have brought it into existence but that blackness is prior to ontology; or, in a slight variation of what Chandler would say, blackness is the anoriginal displacement of ontology, that it is ontology’s anti- and ante-foundation, ontology’s underground, the irreparable disturbance of ontology’s time and space. This is to say that what I do assert, not against, I think, but certainly in apposition to Afro-pessimism, as it is, at least at one point, distilled in Sexton’s work, is not what he calls one of that project’s most polemical dimensions, “namely, that black life is not social, or rather that black life is lived in social death” (Sexton 2011b: 28). What I assert is this: that black life—which is as surely to say life as black thought is to say thought—is irreducibly social; that, moreover, black life is lived in political death or that it is lived, if you will, in the burial ground of the subject by those who, insofar as they are not subjects, are also not, in the interminable (as opposed to the last) analysis, “death-bound,” as Abdul JanMohamed (2005) would say. In this, however, I also agree with Sexton insofar as I am inclined to call this burial ground “the world” and to conceive of it and the desire for it as pathogenic. At stake, now, will be what the difference is between the pathogenic and the pathological, a difference that will have been instantiated by what we might think of as the view, as well as the point of view, of the pathologist. I don’t think I ever claimed, or meant to claim, that Afro-pessimism sees blackness as a kind of pathogen. I think I probably do, or at least hope that it is, insofar as I bear the hope that blackness bears or is the potential to end the world. The question concerning the point of view, or standpoint, of the pathologist is crucial but so is the question of what it is that the pathologist examines. What, precisely, is the morbid body upon which Fanon, the pathologist, trains his eye? What is the object of his “complete lysis” (Fanon 2008: xiv)? And if it is more proper, because more literal, to speak of a lysis of universe, rather than body, how do we think the relation between transcendental frame and the body, or nobody, that occupies, or is banished from, its confines and powers of orientation? What I offer here as a clarification of Sexton’s understanding of my relation to Afro-pessimism emerges from my sense of a kind of terminological dehiscence in Orlando Patterson’s (1982) work that emerges in what I take to be his deep but unacknowledged affinity with and indebtedness to the work of Hannah Arendt, namely, with a distinction crucial to her work between the social and the political. The “secular excommunication” that describes slavery for Patterson (1982: 5) is more precisely understood as the radical exclusion from a political order, which is tantamount, in Arendt’s formulation, with something on the order of a radical relegation to the social. The problem with slavery, for Patterson, is that it is political death, not social death; the problem is that slavery confers the paradoxically stateless status of the merely, barely living; it delineates the inhuman as unaccommodated bios. At stake is the transvaluation or, better yet, the invaluation or antivaluation, the extraction from the sciences of value (and from the very possibility of that necessarily fictional, but materially brutal, standpoint that Wagner [2009: 1] calls “being a party to exchange”). Such extraction will, in turn, be the very mark and inscription (rather than absence or eradication) of the sociality of a life, given in common, instantiated in exchange. What I am trying to get to, by way of this terminological slide in Patterson, is the consideration of a radical disjunction between sociality and the state-sanctioned, state-sponsored terror of power-laden intersubjectivity, which is, or would be, the structural foundation of Patterson’s epiphenomenology of spirit. To have honor, which is, of necessity, to be a man of honor, for Patterson, is to become a combatant in transcendental subjectivity’s perpetual civil war. To refuse the induction that Patterson desires is to enact or perform the recognition of the constitution of civil society as enmity, hostility, and civil butchery. It is, moreover, to consider that the unspoken violence of political friendship constitutes a capacity for alignment and coalition that is enhanced by the unspeakable violence that is done to what and whom the political excludes. This is to say that, yes, I am in total agreement with the Afro-pessimistic understanding of blackness as exterior to civil society and, moreover, as unmappable within the cosmological grid of the transcendental subject. However, I understand civil society and the coordinates of the transcendental aesthetic—cognate as they are not with the failed but rather with the successful state and its abstract, equivalent citizens—to be the fundamentally and essentially antisocial nursery for a necessarily necropolitical imitation of life. So that if Afro-pessimists say that social life is not the condition of black life but is, rather, the political field that would surround it, then that’s a formulation with which I would agree. Social death is not imposed upon blackness by or from the standpoint or positionality of the political; rather, it is the field of the political, from which blackness is relegated to the supposedly undifferentiated mass or blob of the social, which is, in any case, where and what blackness chooses to stay.

### AT: Traber

#### Imaginative fiat provides blueprints for freedom ⁠— otherwise discursive networks are dominated by nostalgia

⁠— edited for potentially problematic language that we do not endorse

McKesson 18, black civil rights activist, supporter and organizer of the Black Lives Matter movement, known for his activism, been active in the protests in Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, Maryland (Deray McKesson, 2018, “On the Other Side of Freedom: The Case for Hope,” Kindle Edition)

If faith is our belief that our world will be better, and hope our belief that it can be better, imagination is what allows us to navigate between the two, to paint a picture of the future that we can one day touch, feel, bring into being. Both require a relationship with the future that is not solely dependent on the past. Both require a belief in things yet to come. We can’t fight for what we can’t imagine. So much of the work of bringing about a better world will be rooted in us ~~seeing~~ [imaging] that something else is possible. It is easier to ~~see~~ and understand a world that has already existed. Part of the allure of the “Make America Great Again” slogan is that the imagery and mental model already exist. Those who tout this mantra are asking us to engage in recall, and they are using images of the past to push us there. We have lived in a time before when white supremacy, bigotry, and hatred were firmly entrenched in our laws and practices. We do not need to imagine that time; it is etched in our memories and our bodies. When we talk about freedom, however, we are forced to imagine it, because we have not yet lived in a time where we’ve experienced it. We must remember that if there is a shared burden on the part of those who want a better future, it is the burden that we all have to imagine our world, to think about what it should and can be. So when people ask me why the political right is so good at messaging, I remind them that it isn’t so much that they’re good at messaging, but that their message is rooted in familiar iconography. It is nostalgia writ large. We are trying to bring about something altogether new, an idea that we must collectively buy into to make it a reality. And unfortunately, it is easy for ideas to get muddied in translation. Think of single-payer health care—we have never seen it in this country, so when we’re asked to buy into this new system, it requires a lot of imagination. It requires us to envision an entire system and structure that has never existed here. So it is no wonder why, for some, conjuring up images of a concrete past during which they benefited handsomely would be attractive. On the left, we have a tendency to veer into squabbles over the image of the future we are fighting for, even when we are essentially fighting for the same thing. And that’s because shared imaginations are difficult to manage. In order to imagine, especially in the midst of trauma, our work is to name the constraints up front and then ignore them. This will be a challenge because they are often so potent, so present. But we can name and expose our limitations, and then work around them. Imagination is often thought of as a soft, feel-good aspect of the work of justice, but without it, we will never win.

#### \*The Black Panthers had reformists tendencies that their evidence ignores

Vernon 14, Associate Professor of Philosophy at York University (Jim Vernon, 2014, “‘I Am We’: The Dialectics of Political Will in Huey P. Newton and the Black Panther Party,” Theory & Event, Vol. 17, No. 4 14)

While I have endeavored above to draw a consistent argument from them, in a way, the Party’s split simply reflects the conflict that runs through Newton’s writings. Their inspirational power, for many, came from his full-throated embrace of the absolute principle of freedom and the revolutionary enthusiasm that flows from it. Their organizational clarity and political purchase, however, came from their insistence upon institutional development and tangible improvement in the lives of the oppressed as the litmus test for freedom’s actualization. Within months, one could find him quoted as saying “The only political power that I see that we can build would be potentially destructive. It is not our choice to be destructive: we would like some other avenue to work through, but the country has left us no choice”,61 but also “This is why the Peace Movement is so important. If the Peace Movement is successful, then the revolution will be successful […] Not only should we communicate with it, we should actually get out and support it fully in various ways including literature and demonstrations” (TDFP, 152). The BPP’s rupture, in essence, was “a reflection of the split in Huey’s own personality, two halves operating in completely separate spheres”, and ultimately of the split in the political will whose necessary, but fraught, unity Newton had implicitly theorized.62 The free will which grounds political action is a tense coalition of revolutionary and reformist tendencies—always haunted by arbitrariness—and each aspect no doubt manifests itself with a different degree of intensity at different times in the distinct individuals whose collective action is required for its actualization. There will thus always be those driven to strike back at the status quo in abstract revolt or empty revenge, or who long to withdraw from it in a separate society of like-minded souls, just as there will always be those who largely accept the current alignment, arbitrarily seek to modify it to suit their interests better, or seek larger change as a matter of principle or even whim. By both giving reformist direction to otherwise destructive revolutionaries, withdrawn separatists and arbitrary opportunists, as well as grounding pragmatic reforms in prescriptive, universal principle and militant commitment, the BPP managed to link seemingly piecemeal institutional changes into a broad program far more dangerous to the status quo than the independently operating would-be separatists, organized terrorists or spontaneous rioters of their day combined. While many “reduce the Party to its community service programs or to armed confrontation with the police” in order to impose a sense of unified consciousness and purpose upon it,63 the BPP itself must be grasped as a site of struggle and contest, rife with internal inconsistencies. It is as easy for a small band of underground revolutionaries—from the BLA to the various manifestations of the Black Bloc tactic—to find unified consciousness and purpose as it is for the reactionary State to isolate and neutralize them. It is the alienating and fruitless violence of such groups that has led, in recent years, groups like Occupy to seek common will through consensual dialogue. For all the inspiration such groups provide, however, their work continues to have little purchase on the situation, guided as it is by the very forms of democratic debate and finite opinion that stabilize the status quo, and infinitely deferred as it is in actually finding a generally acceptable program. What unites these two conceptions of social change is their non-dialectical conception of collective will, pushing towards or presuming from the outset an absolute or general collective consciousness. As the short history of the BPP shows, by forging a tense, imperfect unity between revolutionaries, progressives and even arbitrary actors, seemingly reformist actions can be linked through militant commitment and principle into a potent vehicle for fundamental and sweeping institutional change. Lacking either the universal or particular sides of the free will, political movements generally remain too situationally determined, or too emptily abstract to produce concrete emancipation. Newton’s BPP offers one, no doubt imperfect and unrepeatable, but nevertheless remarkably potent and instructive, example of a political program that allows revolutionaries to constrain their enthusiasm, without abandoning it, within bounds both acceptable and meaningful to those whose lives are a continual, but too particular and often arbitrary, struggle for institutional change. While there are no doubt many lessons to be learned from Newton and the BPP, it is this need for a dialectical, rather than unified, collective to actualize political will that seems both the most pressing, and the least heeded.64

#### \*They viewed themselves as actively political and made demands on the state, which operated within the legal system to justify self-defense ⁠— their own case study contradicts the claims of their alt.

Newton 73, cofounder (with Bobby Seale) of the Black Panther Party (Huey P. Newton, 1973, “Revolutionary suicide,” (1st ed.]. ed.). New York: Harcourt)

It was the spring of 1966. Still without a definite program, we were at the stage of testing ideas that would capture the imagination of the community. We began, as always, by checking around with the street brothers. We asked them if they would be interested in forming the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, which would be based upon defending the community against the aggression of the power structure, including the military and the armed might of the police. We informed the brothers of their right to possess weapons; most of them were interested. Then we talked about how the people are constantly intimidated by arrogant, belligerent police officers and exactly what we could do about it. We went to pool halls and bars, all the places where brothers congregate and talk. I was prepared to give them legal advice. From my law courses at Oakland City College and San Francisco law school I was familiar with the California Penal Code and well-versed in the laws relating to weapons. I also had something very important at my disposal-the law library of the North Oakland Service Center, a community center poverty program where Bobby was working. The Center gave legal advice, and there were many logbooks on the shelf. Unfortunately, most of them dealt with civil law, since the anti-poverty program was not supposed to advise poor people about criminal law. However, I made good use of the books they had to run down the full legal situation two brothers on the street. We were doing what the poverty program claimed to be doing but never had-giving help and counsel to poor people about the things that critically affected their lives. All that summer we circulated in the black communities of Richmond, Berkeley, Oakland, and San Francisco. Wherever brothers gathered, we talked with them about their right to arm. In general, they were interested but skeptical about the weapons idea. They could not see anyone walking around with a gun in full view. To recruit any sizable number of street brothers, we would obviously have to do more than talk. We needed to give practical applications of our theory, show them that we were not afraid of weapons and not afraid of death. The way we finally won the brothers over was by patrolling the police with arms. Before we began the patrols, however, Bobby and I set down in writing a practical course of action. We could go no further without a program, and we resolved to drop everything else, even though it might take a wild to come up with something viable. One day, we went to the North Oakland Service Center to work it out. The Center was an ideal place because of the books and the fact that we could work undisturbed. First, we pull together all the books we had been reading and dozens we had only heard about. We discussed Mao’s program, Cuba’s program, and all the others, but concluded that we could not follow any of them. Our unique situation required a unique program. Although the relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed is universal, forms of oppression vary. The ideas that mobilized the people of Cuba and China Spring from their own history and political structures. The practical parts of those programs could be carried out only under a certain time of oppression. Our program had to deal with America. I started rapping off the essential points for the survival of Black and oppressed people in the United States. Bobby wrote them down, and then we separated those ideas into two sections, “What We Want” and “What We Believe.” We split them up because the ideas fell naturally into two distinct categories. It was necessary to explain why we wanted certain things. At the same time, our goals were based on beliefs, and we set those out, to. In the section on believes, we made it clear that all the objective conditions necessary for attaining our goals were already in existence, but that a number of societal factors stood in our way. This was to help the people understand what was working against them. All in all, our 10-point program took about 20 minutes to write. Thinking it would take days, we were prepared for a long session, but we never got to the small mountain of books piled up around us. We had come to an important realization: books could only point in a general direction; the rest was up to us. This was the program we wrote down: OCTOBER 1966 BLACK PANTHER PARTY PLATFORM AND PROGRAM WHAT WE WANT WHAT WE BELIEVE 1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community. We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny. 2. We want full employment for our people. We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the white American businessman will not get full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessman and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize an employee all of its people and give a high standard of living. 3. we want an end to the robbery by the capitalist of our Black community. We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of 40 acres and two mules . 40 acres and two mules were promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of Black people. We will accept the payment and currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered 6 million Jews. The American racist has taken park in the slaughter of over 50 million Black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make. 4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings. We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our Black community, then the housing and the land should b made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people. 5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society. We believe that in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else. 6. We want all Black men to be exempt from military service. We believe that Black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will no fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like Black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary. 7. We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER of Black people. We believe we can end police brutality in our Black communities by organizing Black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our Black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all Black people should arm themselves for self-defense. 8. We want freedom for all Black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons and jails. We believe that all Black people should be released from the many jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial 9. We want all Black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a juries of their peer group or people from their Black communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United States. We believe that the courts should follow the United States Constitution so that Black people will receive a fair trial. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group. A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical, and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the Black community from which the Black defendant came. We have been and are being tried by all-white juries that have no understanding of the “average reasoning man” of the Black community. 10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice, and peace. And as our major political objective, a United-Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the Black colony in which only Black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate, for the purpose of determining the will of Black people as to their national identity. When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature‘s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such a form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute nepotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security. With the program on paper, we set up the structure of our organization. Babby became Chairman, and I chose the position of Minister of Defense. I was very happy with this arrangement; I do not like to lead formally, and the Chairman has to conduct meetings and be involved in administration. We also discussed having an advisory cabinet as an information arm of the Party. We wanted this cabinet to do research on each of the ten points and their relation to the community and to advise the people on how to implement them. It seemed best to weight the political wing of the Party with street brothers and the advisory cabinet with middle-class Blacks who had the necessary knowledge and skills. We were also seeking a functional unity between middle-class Blacks and the street brothers. I asked my brother Melvin to approach a few friends about serving on the advisory cabinet, but when our plan became clear, they all refused, and the cabinet was deferred. The first member of the Black Panther Party, after Bobby and myself, was Little Bobby Hutton. Little Bobby had met Bobby Seale at the North Oakland Service Center, where both were working, and he immediately became enthusiastic about the nascent organization. Even though he was only about fifteen years old then, he was a responsible and mature person, determined to help the cause of Black people. He became the Party’s first treasurer. Little Bobby was the youngest of seven children; his family had come to Oakland from Arkansas when he was three years old. His parents were good, hard-working people, but Bobby had endured the same hardships and humiliations to which so many young Blacks in poor communities are subjected. Like many of the brothers, he had been kicked out of school. Then he had gotten a part-time job at the Shrive Center. After work he used to come around to Bobby Seale’s house to talk and learn to read. At the time of his murder, he was reading Black Reconstruction in America, by W.E.B. DuBois. Bobby was a serious revolutionary, but there was nothing grim about him. He had an infectious smile and a disarming quality that made people love him. He died courageously, the first Black Panther to make the supreme sacrifice for the people. We all attempt to carry on the work he began. We started now to implement our ten-point program. Interested primarily in educating and revolutionizing the community, we needed to get their attention and give them something to identify with. This is why the seventh point-police action- was the first program we emphasized. Point 7 stated “We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER of Black people.” This is a major issue in every Black community. The military arm of our oppressors and continually brutalize us. Many communities have tried and failed to get civilian review boards to supervise the behavior of the police. In some places, organized citizen patrols have followed the police and observed them in their community dealings. They take pictures and make tape recordings of the encounters and report misbehavior to the authorities. However, the authorities responsible for overseeing the police are policemen themselves and usually side against the citizens. We recognize that it was ridiculous to report the police to the police, but we hoped that by raising encounters to a higher level, by patrolling the police with arms, we would see a change in their behavior. Further, the community would notice this and become interested in the Party. Thus our armed patrols were also a means of recruiting. At first, the patrols were a total success. Frightened and confused, the police did not know how to respond, because they had never encountered patrols like this before. They were familiar with the community-alert patrols in other cities, but never before had guns been an integral part of any patrol program. With weapons in our hands, we were no longer their subjects but their equals. Out on patrol, we stopped whenever we saw the police questioning a brother or a sister. We would walk over with our weapons and observe them from a “safe” distance so that the police could not say we were interfering with the performance of their duty. We would ask the community members if they were being abused. Most of the time, when a policeman saw us coming, he slipped his book back into his pocket, got into his car, and left in a hurry. The citizens who had been stopped were as amazed as the police at our sudden appearance. I always carried law books in my car. Sometimes, when a policeman was harassing a citizen, I would stand off a little and read the relevant portions of the penal code in a loud voice to all within hearing distance. In doing this, we were helping to educate those who gathered to observe these incidents. If the policeman arrested the citizen and took him to the station, we would follow and immediately post bail. Many community people could not believe at first that we had only their interests at heart. Nobody had ever given them any support or assistance when the police harassed them, but here we were, proud Black men, armed with guns and a knowledge of the law. Many citizens came right out of jail and into the Party, and the statistics of murder and brutality by policemen in our communities fell sharply. Each day we went out on our watch. Sometimes, we got on a policeman’s tail and followed him with our weapons in full view. If he darted around the block or made a U-turn trying to follow us, we let him do it until he got tied fo that. Then, we would follow him again. Either way, we too up a good bit of police time that otherwise would have been spent in harassment. As our forces built up, we doubled the patrols, then tippled them; we began to patrol everywhere- Oakland, Richmond, Berkeley, and San Fransisco. Most patrols were a part of our normal movement around the community. We kept them random, however, so that the police could not set a network to anticipate us. They never knew when or where we were going to show up. It might be late at night or early in the morning; some brothers would go on patrol the same time every day, but never in a specific pattern or in the same geographical area. The chief purpose of the patrols was to teach the community security against the police, and we did not need a regular schedule for that. We knew that no particular area could be totally defended; only the community could effectively defend and eventually liberate itself. Our aim was simply to teach them how to go about it. We passed out our literature and ten-point program to the citizens who gathered, discussed community defense, and educated them about their rights concerning weapons. All along, the number of members grew. The Black Panthers were and always required to keep their activities within legal bounds. This was emphasized repeatedly in our political education classes and also when we taught weapons care. If we overstepped legal bounds, the police would easily gain the upper hand and be able to continue their intimidation. We also knew the community was somewhat fearful of the gun and of the policeman who had it. So, we studied the law about weapons and kept within our rights. To be arrested for having weapons would have been a setback to our program of teaching the people their constitutional right to bear arms. As long as we kept everything legal, the police could do nothing, and the people would see that armed defense was a legitimate, constitutional right. In this way, they would lose their doubts and fears and be able to move against the oppressor.

#### The Black Panther Party actively sought alliances with “whiteness” via the Rainbow Coalition

Gaiter 17, Associate Professor in the Department of Art and Design at the University of Delaware. Her writing on former Black Panther artist Emory Douglas's work appears in the monograph Black Panther: The Revolutionary Art of Emory Douglas, http://bit.ly/2iN0tZ3 and West of Center: Art and the Counterculture Experiment in America, 1965-1977, http://bit.ly/2wt0dSo among other publications, continues to write about Douglas's work including his current international human rights activism, wrote the introduction to the second edition of his monograph, published in 2011 (Colette Gaiter. 1-8-2017, “Chicago 1969: When Black Panthers aligned with Confederate-flag-wielding, working-class whites,” <http://theconversation.com/chicago-1969-when-black-panthers-aligned-with-confederate-flag-wielding-working-class-whites-68961>)

In the 2016 presidential election, Donald Trump won the white vote across all demographics except for college-educated white women. He did especially well among working class white voters: 67 percent of whites without a college degree voted for him. Some post-election analysis marveled at how the white working class could vote against its own interests by supporting a billionaire businessman who is likely to support policies that cut taxes for the rich and weaken the country’s social safety net. Since the New Deal, the Democratic Party has been seen as the party of working people, while Republicans were considered the party of the elites. Donald Trump was able to flip this narrative to his advantage. Election 2016 balkanized issues and made it seem impossible to work on racism, sexism, poverty and economic issues all at once. A core question moving forward for social justice advocates and the Democratic Party is how they can move beyond identity politics and attract working-class voters of all races, building stronger coalitions among disparate groups. One place to look for inspiration and instruction might be 1960s social movements that understood the power of alliances across identities and issues. During this period, a radical coalition formed that might seem impossible today: A group of migrant southerners and working-class white activists called the Young Patriots joined forces with the Black Panthers in Chicago to fight systemic class oppression. So how did this alliance form? And how can its lessons be applied to today’s political moment? An unlikely alliance In the post-civil rights era, a militant Black Power movement emerged, with the Black Panther Party for Self Defense forming in 1966. Inspired by Malcolm X and other international black thought leaders, the group embraced armed struggle as a potential tool against organized racial oppression – a radical break from the philosophy of nonviolent protest. A large faction of the group developed in Chicago, where one of the party leaders was a young man named Fred Hampton. Chicago in the 1960s was a brutal place for poor people. Black, brown and white people all dealt with poverty, unemployment, police violence, substandard housing, inadequate schools and a lack of social services. Ethnic and racial groups each created their own social service and activist networks to combat every kind of oppression. One was the Young Patriot Organization (YPO), which was based in Hillbilly Harlem, an uptown neighborhood of Chicago populated by displaced white southerners. Many YPO members were racist, and they flaunted controversial symbols associated with southern pride, such as the Confederate flag. But like blacks and Latinos, the white Young Patriots and their families experienced discrimination in Chicago. In their case, it was because they were poor and from the South. In his short time as a Black Panther leader, Fred Hampton wanted to advance the group’s goals by forming a “Rainbow Coalition” of working class and poor people of all races. Former members of the Chicago Panthers and YPO tell different versions of the same story of how the groups connected: Each attended the other’s organizing meetings and decided to work together on their common issues. Over time, the Black Panthers learned to tolerate Confederate flags as intransigent signs for rebellion. Their only stipulation was that the white Young Patriots denounce racism. Eventually, Young Patriots rejected their deeply embedded ideas of white supremacy – and even the Confederate flag – as they realized how much they had in common with the Black Panthers and Latino Young Lords. Despite many differences, the two groups united under the umbrella of economic justice. Redneck Revolt Assumed to be natural enemies, these groups united in their calls for economic justice. In the Aug. 9, 1969 issue of The Black Panther newspaper, the party’s chief of staff, David Hilliard, admiringly called the Young Patriots “the only revolutionaries we respect that ever came out of the mother country.” Recalling his work with the YPO, former Black Panther Bobby Lee explained that “The Rainbow Coalition was just a code word for class struggle.” In the end, the Illinois Panthers brought together various elements of the black community, Confederate flag-waving southern white migrants (Young Patriots), Puerto Ricans (Young Lords), poor white ethnic groups (Rising Up Angry, JOIN Community Union, and the Intercommunal Survival Committee), students and the women’s movement. The disparate groups under the coalition’s umbrella pooled resources and shared strategies for providing community services and aid that the government and private sector would not. Initiatives included health clinics, feeding homeless and hungry people, and legal advice for those dealing with unethical landlords and police brutality. In 2016, a stark racial divide is exposed Almost 50 years after the original Rainbow Coalition, the U.S. electorate remains divided along racial lines. Even though Donald Trump asked black Americans, “What do you have to lose?” by voting for him and abandoning the Democratic Party, it didn’t work: Only 8 percent of black voters (and 28 percent of Latino and 27 percent of Asian voters) cast ballots for Trump. Blacks and Latinos are well-represented in the working class, and people of color will become the majority in the working class in 2032. A button depicts the partnership between the Young Patriots and the Black Panthers. Much 2016 post-election attention has focused on working-class white voters, who have been characterized as “forgotten” and “angry” for being left out of the economic recovery. Yet African-Americans have been far worse off; since the 2007 recession, the unemployment rate of African-Americans is nearly double that of Hispanics and more than twice that of whites. Hillary Clinton was the candidate who collected the most diverse voter base – the 2016 Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia looked like the Rainbow Coalition redux – and she was expected to win the election. However, that visual hid racism’s residual and deeply entrenched place in U.S. society. One of the lessons of the 2016 election is that the country is not as advanced in its work on ending racism and discrimination as most would like to believe. Donald Trump did not have to do much to capitalize on this. The Rainbow Coalition members in 1960s Chicago understood how difficult it is to build coalitions across identities. Former Black Panther Bobby Lee recalled working with the Young Patriots: “It wasn’t easy to build an alliance. I advised them on how to set up ‘serve the people’ programs – free breakfasts, people’s health clinics, all that. I had to run with those cats, break bread with them, hang out at the pool hall. I had to lay down on their couch, in their neighborhood. Then I had to invite them into mine. That was how the Rainbow Coalition was built, real slow.” The coalition, bringing together seemingly polar opposite Black Panthers and Young Patriots, showed that real interactions allow people to understand that their struggles are not essentially different. Donald Trump probably was sincere when he invited African-Americans to join his movement. He simply didn’t realize that a glib invitation would not produce the same results as real coalition-building over a period of time. The lesson to learn from studying 1960s social movements is that lasting change toward economic and racial justice will probably be built brick by brick, person to person and “real slow.”

# 1NR

## Case

### 1NC---Turn

#### Their performative critique is an entrenchment of the 2nd University---an optimistic belief that critique in University settings accomplishes something---that voting aff does something is a link that is coopted.

Ladoen 21 Shannon Lodoen, PhD student in English and Rhetoric at the University of Waterloo, JoMR 4.2 Progress and Power in the First, Second, and Third Universities A Case Study of the University of Waterloo, <http://journalofmultimodalrhetorics.com/files/documents/248e1a2f-2932-44a9-91af-9a240f1cd37f.pdf>

Dana Porter Library (LIB) is also highlighted as part of the second university because, although libraries can support the goals of all three universities, they tend to be sites of conventional learning that takes place in a vacuum rather than in the real world; people can read all they want about revolution, indigenization, critical race theory, etc., but reading alone does not necessitate change or action. Additionally, while campus libraries can house thousands of texts, these texts generally convey information that falls within a certain range of “acceptability” and thus they perpetuate the status quo, or at least don’t directly challenge it. Another instance of the second university is the Centre for Teaching Excellence, with its focus on pedagogy training and student-centered learning methods (oddly enough, the CTE is located in the Mathematics and Computing Building). The Graduate House (GH) also demonstrates elements of the second university, as it provides a place for graduate students and faculty to meet and cultivate relationships, to share food and time together that is not strictly dedicated to academics or business (as opposed to the Food Services locations spread out across UW which serve the sole purpose of keeping students going through long days on campus). Although perhaps more varied in scope than the first university (at least from my selections), I would argue that these spaces also support conventional notions of progress, even as they subvert conventional expectations of labour and productivity. The second university tends to focus more on unquantifiable learning goals, such as critical thinking and other so-called “soft skills.” Thus, the sort of labour that occurs within the second university is much less tangible (and thus recognizable) than that which occurs in the testing labs, workshops, and computer hubs of the first university. However, the notions of progress and development are still highly prevalent, although not in the monetized, technologized, or objectified forms valued by the first university. paperson (2017) notes that, “[a]t least ideologically, the second world university is committed to the transformation of society through critique, through a deconstruction of systems of power” (p. 41, emphasis added). There is a firm belief in the second university that, by deconstructing the “bad” systems of power, it can replace them with “good” ones. This sentiment is, again, informed by rhetoric’s “affirmative function” that “preserve[s] a world of meaning, one in which material reality is not blindly cruel and indifferent but welcome, reassuring, and kind” (Packer and Stoneman, 2018, p. 2). It assumes that, if people are more informed—if they perform the necessary psychological and emotional labour to ameliorate their awareness of their positionality and perspective—they will make choices that are fairer, kinder, and even decolonizing. As paperson (2017) points out though, the second university is a “pedagogical utopia” rather than a driver of change. Although it wants a world wherein “professor ceases to profess, where hierarchies disappear [and] all personal knowledges are special” (p. 42), in the end this is a naïve (if well-intentioned) goal informed and sustained by a foundational belief in people’s boundless ability to progress and grow. This is not to say that personal growth is not a good thing in itself; it is important for all students to develop and grow as a result of their education. The issue with the second university is, for paperson, that this pedagogical utopia is a surrogate for genuine action and change. The mental labour, which manifests in eloquent essays, impassioned poetry, affirmative action mandates, and reading groups (to name a few examples) does not make it into the “real world.” Porter et al. (2000) call attention to the dearth of active institutional critique in their field when they ask: “Where do we find instances of institutional critique in [rhetoric and composition studies]? Nowhere, yet—at least not fully articulated examples” (p. 626).35 Far from remaining in the realm of ideas or inspiration, institutional critique must be a “fundamental pragmatic effort” (p. 625) that works through disciplinary reform (p. 617), classroom critique (p. 616), and administrative amendment (p. 614). In essence, Porter et al. are calling for a movement towards the third university, which requires and is indeed predicated on labour—not the forms of labour that are prized by the university as an institution, but rather the invisible and often underappreciate labours that go into challenging and reforming institutions from the ground up.

#### Criticism from within the University turns case and magnifies racism

Andrews 16 Kehinde Andrews is professor of black studies at Birmingham City University. I compared universities to slave plantations to disturb, not discourage, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/24/universities-slave-plantations-racist

As places of critical thought, universities have the allure of being incubators for progressive ideals. Student movements and academic developments such as feminism and black studies play into this mythical notion. The reality is, however, that until the 1960s, less than 5% of the population went to university and they were bastions of white, male privilege. In the 18th century, the botanist Carl Linnaeus, in his System Naturae, outlined the hierarchy of being, with Europaeus Albus (white) at the top and Afer Niger (black), firmly at the bottom. It is no coincidence that he has a university in Sweden named after him. My colleague Nathaniel Coleman highlighted the role of Francis Galton at UCL promoting the eugenics movement; and racial “science” was a key Nazi justification for the Holocaust. Deepa Naik perfectly summed up the universities’ role in society when she argued at last year’s NUS black students’ conference that “the university is not racist, it is racism”. The reason I invoked Audre Lorde’s metaphor of the university as the “master’s house” was as a challenge to academics. We cannot assume that just because the student body has become more diverse since the 60s that the role of universities has changed. Other presenters on the day highlighted the inequalities present in universities: from staff experiences of being ignored or mistaken for the cleaner, to prospective ethnic minority students being warned off applying to elite universities because they would not fit in. The exclusionary curriculum, bought to the fore by the student-led campaign “Why is my curriculum white?” also featured prominently in the day. If we understand the university as the master’s house, then the institutional racism embedded in universities does not come as a surprise. If the university is racism, then of course the experience within it will be exclusionary. For an academic concerned with overcoming racial inequality, this poses a very serious challenge. In class when I taught these concepts, one of my students diagnosed my role as that of the “overseer”, maintaining the system of racial oppression. This jarring metaphor serves as a reminder of the institutional role of universities, which I can do little to alter. The inequalities in the school system affect who achieves the grades to attend; students who do make the grade are charged £9,000 a year and the government just replaced maintenance grants for the poorest students with loans. Universities assign credentials to graduates that justify their place in the social order; however, the likelihood of achieving the “best” degree, from the “top” institutions is too heavily influenced by class and race to even resemble a meritocracy. Instead, the result is a system that reproduces the inequalities in society. The nature of academia is that career advancement is achieved by attending conferences and writing papers for other academics, creating a self-referential bubble where our critical knowledge gets trapped within the university. The separation of thought from action, of university from the social world, is a key way that inequalities are maintained. The academic industrial complex creates institutional forms as real and discriminatory as those that exist in the police force, which we are quick to condemn. If the university is the master house, then we are among the tools that maintain the edifice.

#### They say the academy is a non-unique space, that’s our argument, they invest in it knowing the aff will fail, which is worse than the squo because it validates the squo.

#### They say we link, we don’t---we have not ascribed value to debate outside of being a game.

### 1NR---Webb

### 1NR---AT: Music

### 1NR---Whiteness Turn

#### The lens of ‘whiteness’ is incompatible with responding to anti-Blackness

Lewis Gordon 18, Professor at the University of Connecticut, and Scott Phillips, runs the HSImpact Podcast, “HSI Podcast 81 – Dr. Lewis Gordon” HSImpact, 4-24-18, transcribed 1:35-62:28, https://hsimpact.wordpress.com/2018/04/24/hsi-podcast-81-dr-lewis-gordon/

Scott Phillips: Well I guess we can jump right into it then. Most of our listeners being born after 1995, can we start by talking about Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism, and specifically what do you see as the difference between discussing racism through a lens of whiteness or white supremacy vs a lens of Antiblackness. Are those things compatible? Are they fundamentally different? And if so, what do you choose the lens of Antiblackness

Lewis Gordon: They are fundamentally different. The simple answer is you could get rid of white supremacy but maintain antiblack racism. How? Because even if people reject the idea that white people are superior to everyone else, they can still endorse the view that black people are inferior to everyone. And, as we’ve seen in many parts of the world, there are many people of color who just, frankly, hate black people. So, getting rid of supremacy doesn’t get rid of antiblack racism.

#### That leads to repetitive suffering

Mbembe 2015 (Achille, 9/9/15, “Achille Mbembe on The State of South African Political Life”, Africa is a country, <https://africasacountry.com/2015/09/achille-mbembe-on-the-state-of-south-african-politics/>, accessed 11/27) JA

What we are hearing is that there have not been enough meaningful, decisive, radical change, not only in terms of the life chances of the black poor, but – and this is the novelty – in terms of the future prospects of the black middle class. What is being said is that twenty years after freedom, we have not disrupted enough the structures that maintain and reproduce “white power and supremacy”; that this is the reason why too many amongst us are trapped in a “bad life” that keeps wearing them out and down; that this wearing out and down of black life has been going on for too long and must now be brought to an end by all means necessary (the right to violence?). We are being told that we have not radically overturned the particular sets of interests that are produced and reproduced through white privilege in institutions of public and private life – in law firms, in financial institutions such as banking and insurance, in advertising and industry, in terms of land redistribution, in media, universities, languages and culture in general. “Whiteness”, “white power”, “white supremacy”, “white monopoly capital” is firmly back on the political and cultural agenda and to be white in South Africa now is to face a new-old kind of trial although with new judges – the so-called “born-free”. Politics of impatience But behind whites trial looms a broader indictment of South African social and political order. South Africa is fast approaching its Fanonian moment. A mass of structurally disenfranchised people have the feeling of being treated as “foreigners” on their own land. Convinced that the doors of opportunity are closing, they are asking for firmer demarcations between “citizens” (those who belong) and “foreigners” (those who must be excluded). They are convinced that as the doors of opportunity keep closing, those who won’t be able to “get in” right now might be left out for generations to come – thus the social stampede, the rush to “get in” before it gets too late, the willingness to risk a fight because waiting is no longer a viable option. The old politics of waiting is therefore gradually replaced by a new politics of impatience and, if necessary, of disruption. Brashness, disruption and a new anti-decorum ethos are meant to bring down the pretence of normality and the logics of normalization in this most “abnormal” society. Steve Biko, Frantz Fanon and a plethora of black feminist, queer, postcolonial, decolonial and critical race theorists are being reloaded in the service of a new form of militancy less accommodationist and more trenchant both in form and content. The age of impatience is an age when a lot is said – all sorts of things we had hardly heard about during the last twenty years; some ugly, outrageous, toxic things, including calls for murder, atrocious things that speak to everything except to the project of freedom, in this age of fantasy and hysteria, when the gap between psychic realities and actual material realities has never been so wide, and the digital world only serves as an amplifier of every single moment, event and accident. The age of urgency is also an age when new wounded bodies erupt and undertake to actually occupy spaces they used to simply haunt. They are now piling up, swearing and cursing, speaking with excrements, asking to be heard. They speak in allegories and analogies – the “colony”, the “plantation”, the “house Negro”, the “field Negro”, blurring all boundaries, embracing confusion, mixing times and spaces, at the risk of anachronism. They are claiming all kinds of rights – the right to violence; the right to disrupt and jam that which is parading as normal; the right to insult, intimidate and bully those who do not agree with them; the right to be angry, enraged; the right to go to war in the hope of recovering what was lost through conquest; the right to hate, to wreak vengeance, to smash something, it doesn’t matter what, as long as it looks “white”. All these new “rights” are supposed to achieve one thing we are told the 1994 “peaceful settlement” did not achieve – decolonization and retributive justice, the only way to restore a modicum of dignity to victims of the injuries of yesterday and today. Demythologizing whiteness And yet, some hard questions must be asked. Why are we invested in turning whiteness, pain and suffering into such erotogenic objects? Could it be that the concentration of our libido on whiteness, pain and suffering is after all typical of the narcissistic investments so privileged by this neoliberal age? To frame the issues in these terms does not mean embracing a position of moral relativism. How could it be? After all, in relation to our history, too many lives were destroyed in the name of whiteness. Furthermore, the structural repetition of past sufferings in the present is beyond any reasonable doubt. Whiteness as a necrophiliac power structure and a primary shaper of a global system of unequal redistribution of life chances will not die a natural death. But to properly engineer its death – and thus the end of the nightmare it has been for a large portion of the humanity – we urgently need to demythologize it. If we fail to properly demythologize whiteness, whiteness – as the machine in which a huge portion of the humanity has become entangled in spite of itself – will end up claiming us. As a result of whiteness having claimed us; as a result of having let ourselves be possessed by it in the manner of an evil spirit, we will inflict upon ourselves injuries of which whiteness, at its most ferocious, would scarcely have been capable. Indeed for whiteness to properly operate as the destructive force it is in the material sphere, it needs to capture its victim’s imagination and turn it into a poison well of hatred. For victims of white racism to hold on to the things that truly matter, they must incessantly fight against the kind of hatred which never fails to destroy, in the first instance, the person ~~man or woman~~ who hates while leaving the structure of whiteness itself intact. As a poisonous fiction that passes for a fact, whiteness seeks to institutionalize itself as an event by any means necessary. This it does by colonizing the entire realms of desire and of the imagination. To demythologize whiteness, it will not be enough to force “bad whites” into silence or into confessing guilt and/or complicity. This is too cheap. To puncture and deflate the fictions of whiteness will require an entirely different regime of desire, new approaches in the constitution of material, aesthetic and symbolic capital, another discourse on value, on what matters and why. The demythologization of whiteness also requires that we develop a more complex understanding of South African versions of whiteness here and now. This is the only country on Earth in which a revolution took place which resulted in not one single former oppressor losing anything. In order to keep its privileges intact in the post-1994 era, South African whiteness has sought to intensify its capacity to invest in what we should call the resources of the offshore. It has attempted to fence itself off, to re-maximize its privileges through self-enclaving and the logics of privatization. These logics of offshoring and self-enclaving are typical of this neoliberal age.

### 1NR---Abolition Turn

### 1NR---AT “We Didn’t Read It”